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1. INTRODUCTION
Satellites and other spacecraft have quietly become an essential
part of the world’s infrastructure and now play an indispensable
role in our everyday lives, empowering countless services ranging
from communications to banking, weather reports, safety functions, and navigation.1 Perhaps more ominously, however, space
has also become a vital military domain as space systems represent
invaluable national security assets for the United States and other
countries.2 Space is in fact so fundamental to modern American
military power that U.S. defense officials have suggested that
without space systems, “many of our most important military advantages evaporate.”3
The militarization of space has proceeded in spite of the peaceful purposes which were established for its exploration and use in
the first legal instrument developed to govern space activities.4
Even though states are committed to use space only for “peaceful
purposes,” this ambiguous phrase has historically been subject to
competing interpretations.5 The prevailing interpretation, which
allows the use of space “for military purposes so long as they are
not aggressive in character,” has left space open to diverse and ex1
UCS Satellite Database, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Aug. 11, 2016),
http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space-weapons/satellitedatabase#.WBVBAfkrLIV [https://perma.cc/B3FX-62CS]; Space Debris: Orbiting
Debris Threatens Sustainable Use of Outer Space, UNITED NATIONS (2008),
http://www.un.org/en/events/tenstories/08/spacedebris.shtml
[https://
perma.cc/U9GZ-NSCG].
2 William J. Lynn, III, [former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense], A Military
Strategy for the New Space Environment, 34:3 WASH. Q. 7, 7 (Summer 2011) (“Space
systems enable our modern way of war. They allow our warfighters to strike with
precision, to navigate with accuracy, to communicate with certainty, and to see
the battlefield with clarity”).
3 Id.
4
See, e.g., Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
Preamble, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Outer
Space Treaty] (entered into force July 11, 1984) (“Recognizing the common interest
of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes”).
5
P.K. MENON, THE UNITED NATIONS’ EFFORTS TO OUTLAW THE ARMS RACE IN
OUTER SPACE: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH KEY DOCUMENTS 29, 34 (1988) (noting that interpretation of the phrase “peaceful purposes” has been a highly controversial
problem since the beginning of the space age, with one principal school of
thought holding that the phrase refers to “nonmilitary activity” and the other
holding that it refers to “nonaggressive activity”).
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panding military activities.6
Rather than a hoped-for, peaceful utopia, space thus continues
to evolve into a highly militarized, contested, and dangerously insecure domain in which many states view each other’s activities
there with great suspicion and seek to counter growing, perceived
threats. As U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work recently
observed in announcing the creation of a new U.S. space operations center, the threats posed by Russia and China have spurred
the U.S. military “to develop the tactics, techniques, [and] procedures” to recognize and take on threats in order “to prevail in conflicts that extend into space.”7 He suggested that although space
had once been a “virtual sanctuary,” it must now “be considered a
contested operational domain in ways that we haven’t had to think
about in the past.”8
Other countries, however, have voiced their own concerns
about U.S. military activities in space. On Oct. 17, 2014, a remotecontrolled X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle (dubbed a “secret space
plane”) completed a record-setting 674-day mission orbiting earth
as it performed classified missions for the U.S. Air Force.9 In spite
of the secrecy surrounding the project, Pentagon officials denied
that the plane has “anything to do with space weapons.”10 Suspicious foreign observers, especially in Russia and China, disagree.
Many of them view the X-37B space plane as a prototype of a new
space weapon which may be capable of disabling or destroying
6
Id. at 35 (noting that the Soviet Union and the United States ultimately
chose to preserve discretion in the interpretation of the term “peaceful use” and
agreed that space “can be used for military purposes so long as they are nonaggressive in character”).
7
Marcus Weisgerber & Patrick Tucker, Pentagon Rushing to Open Space-War
Center To Counter China, Russia, DEFENSE ONE, June 23, 2015, http://
www.defenseone.com/management/2015/06/pentagon-preparing-war-spacerussia-china/116101/ [https://perma.cc/C3UH-K2X9] (noting also that “[t]he ugly reality that we must now all face is that if an adversary were able to take space
away from us, our ability to project decisive power across transoceanic distances
and overmatch adversaries in theaters once we get there . . . would be critically weakened”).
8 Id.
9 Alan Yuhas, X-37B Secret Space Plane's Mission Remains Mystery Outside US
Military, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 27, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2014/oct/26/x37b-us-military-secret-space-plane-mission
[https://
perma.cc/E5GG-6JT2].
10 William J. Broad, Surveillance Suspected as Spacecraft’s Main Role, N.Y. TIMES,
May
22,
2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/23/science/space/
23secret.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/2AL9-YWHL].
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satellites and other targets in space or on earth.11
For its part, the U.S. Government consistently reaffirms its
support of the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, but also
asserts its right to “prevent and deter aggression against space infrastructure that supports U.S. national security.”12 Unfortunately,
fear often seems to dominate the views of potential U.S. adversaries as they assess new U.S. military projects in space like the X37B.13 Such fears predictably generate counter-measures by threatened states (such as developing their own variant of the X-37B),
leading in turn to the prospect of an arms race in space.14

Fear, suspicion, perceived threats, and continuing allegations of hostile acts continue to undermine the status of space
as a secure and peaceful domain. In 2012, Russian officials
claimed that a Russian satellite had been disabled by a secret
weapon, presumably operated by the United States. 15 More
recently, Russia has refused to respond to inquiries regarding
11 See, e.g., Air Force’s Top-Secret X-37B Spacecraft Lands After Nearly Two Years
in Orbit, RT (Russian News), Oct. 17, 2014, http://rt.com/usa/196988-air-forcespace-plane-lands/ [https://perma.cc/V2G4-5HTF] (“Some postulate that [the X37B] could be used to attack and destroy adversaries’ satellites orbiting the
Earth”).
12
See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE STRATEGY:
UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY at 5 (2011), available at http://www.defense.gov/home/
features/2011/0111nsss/docs/NationalSecuritySpaceStrategyUnclassified
SummaryJan2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/N8CV-6QN3] [hereinafter N ATIONAL
SECURITY SPACE STRATEGY].
13
See, e.g., Fred Weir, Can Russia Rival the X-37B Space Plane with its Own Robotic
Spacecraft?,
CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE
MONITOR,
Feb.
3,
2011,
http://
www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2011/0203/Can-Russia-rival-the-X-37Bspace-plane-with-its-own-robotic-spacecraft
[https://perma.cc/LM7B-U3WZ]
(noting that “[m]ost Russian media coverage about the mini-shuttle [the X-37B]
was dominated by fear”).
14 See, e.g., Lewis Page, Russia has 'Secret Space Warplane’ to Match US X-37B,
THE REGISTER, Feb. 4, 2011, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/02/04/x37b_ski/
[https://perma.cc/XX4D-3XJ2] (noting that Russia has claimed that it is working
on an unmanned spaceplane similar to the U.S.’s X-37B).
15 See, e.g., Andrew E. Kramer, Russia’s Failed Mars Probe Crashes Into Pacific,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
01/16/science/space/russias-phobos-grunt-mars-probe-crashes-into-pacific.html
[https://perma.cc/QC6N-F5GM] (noting a Russian space official’s speculation
that the Phobos-Grunt satellite might have been hit by an anti-satellite weapon);
Andrew E. Kramer, Russian Official Suggests Weapon Caused Exploration Spacecraft’s
Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/01/11/science/space/russian-official-suggests-weapon-caused-spacecraftfailure.html [https://perma.cc/HG49-AT8C] (noting the Russian allegation that
U.S. radar installations in Alaska might have damaged the Phobos-Grunt satellite).
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a “mysterious object” launched by the Russian military
which has engaged in various sophisticated maneuvers and
is described as “stoking fears over the revival of a defunct
Kremlin project to destroy satellites.”16 Meanwhile, back on
earth, several states continue to employ technologies that interfere with satellite transmissions for various political purposes.17

It is in this insecure environment that the international community now confronts a serious and growing threat to all future
uses of space: the problem of orbital space debris.18 Space debris
consists of all manner of “junk” left in space, including defunct satellites, rocket stages used in previous launches, nose cones, payload covers, shrouds, bolts, solid propellant slag, space activity
cast-aways, deterioration fragments (peeled paint, etc.) and fragments from exploding batteries, fuel tanks, and collisions.19 Even
the smallest piece of debris, travelling at speeds of many thousands
of kilometers per hour, has the potential to damage or destroy a
spacecraft or harm an astronaut and can remain in orbit for hundreds or even thousands of years (depending on its altitude and
related orbital drag and decay).20
In an ominous development in February 2009, the first major
collision of two satellites in orbit occurred (a defunct Russian
16
Sam Jones, Object 2014-28E – Space Junk or Russian Satellite Killer?,
FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 17, 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/cdd0bdb66c27-11e4-990f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3MeMsL2Nr
[https://perma.cc/7AZJH8CU].
17 Lynn, supra note 2, at 7–16 (noting how satellite broadcasts by the BBC and
other organizations have been disrupted by states such as Libya and Iran and that
“even less technologically developed countries such as Ethiopia have employed
jamming technologies for political purposes”).
18 Press Statement, Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, International
Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (Jan. 17, 2012),
http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/01/180969.htm
[https://perma.cc/5TMF-HCDD] (“The long-term sustainability of our space environment is at serious risk from space debris and irresponsible actors.”) [hereinafter Press Statement, Sec’y of State Clinton].
19 See Focus on Growing Threat of Space Debris, EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY, Apr.
18, 2013, http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/ Operations/Space_Debris/Focus_
on_growing_threat_of_space_debris/ [https://perma.cc/98PF-ETGJ] (noting that
space is clogged with the leftovers from the near-5000 launches by all spacefaring
nations since the start of the space age); Space Debris: Orbiting Debris Threatens Sustainable Use of Outer Space, supra note 1 (describing the peril posed to orbiting satellites by accumulating outer space debris).
20
Space Debris: Orbiting Debris Threatens Sustainable Use of Outer Space, supra
note 1.
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communications satellite and an operational US satellite, each travelling at 17,500 miles an hour), creating a huge cloud of space debris that may threaten orbiting spacecraft for decades.21 The junkyard of space debris orbiting earth is now so extensive that many
more collisions are expected, at an increasingly frequent rate.22
The precarious security situation in space has dramatically
contributed to the threat posed by orbiting space debris. In 2007,
the People’s Republic of China demonstrated its military capabilities and stunned the international community by conducting an
anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) test against one of its own aging
weather satellites, generating a massive cloud of orbiting space debris that now poses a collision risk to all spacecraft in, or passing
through, low earth orbit.23 According to the Chief Scientist and
Program
Manager
of
the
National Aeronautics
and
Space Administration (NASA) Orbital Debris Program Office,
Nicholas Johnson, “[t]his is by far the worst satellite fragmentation
in the history of the space age, in the past 50 years . . . . Many of
these debris will be in orbit for 100 years or more because the altitude of the breakup was so high.”24
21
Id.; William J. Broad, Debris Spews into Space after Satellites Collide, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/12/
science/space/12satellite.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/9GKH-U6ZY] (noting
that the Russian and American communications satellites “cracked up in silent
destruction” and that the American Iridium satellite was part of a constellation of
66 spacecraft).
22 Christian Torres, Report Says Space Debris Past ‘Tipping Point,’ NASA Needs
to Step Up Action, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
national/health-science/reports-says-space-debris-past-tipping-point-nasa-needsto-step-up-action/2011/08/31/gIQAo6WTuJ_story.html
[https://perma.cc/
ZLX5-9B5Y] (noting the possibility that if debris reaches a critical mass, it could
set off a chain reaction of more collisions, resulting in a cascading effect in which
debris would continually collide with one another and create even more debris).
23 William J. Broad & David E. Sanger, Flexing Muscle, China Destroys Satellite
in Test, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/19/world/
asia/19china.html? [https://perma.cc/W4U3-DRCZ]; NASA Orbital Debris Program Office, Fengyun-1C Debris: Two Years Later, 13 ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS 2 (Jan.
2009), available at https://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/quarterly-news/pdfs/
odqnv13i1.pdf [https://perma.cc/YGH2-XF87] (noting that the Fengyun-1C debris cloud accounted “for more than 25% of all cataloged objects” in low earth orbit in 2008, with 400 objects still to be catalogued).
24
Frank Morring, Jr., China ASAT Test Called Worst Single Debris Event Ever,
AVIATION WEEK, Feb 11, 2007, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/
1790313/posts [https://perma.cc/6TPG-UC28]. The orbit of a particular satellite
is a function of its mission. Most satellites in low earth orbit operate at altitudes of
hundreds of kilometers up to around 1,000 km. The lower the altitude, the greater
the atmospheric drag. This drag slows a satellite and will eventually decay its orbit and force it to fall to earth (unless the satellite has maneuvering capabilities).
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The debris-generating Chinese ASAT test in 2007 and the growing threat posed by orbital space debris prompted the international
community to reexamine the existing international legal and administrative framework that regulates military and civilian activities in outer space. This framework is founded on two sets of authorities: “hard law” and “soft law.” The hard law space regime
consists of legally binding rules, drawn principally from a small set
of multilateral agreements (the Outer Space Treaty, the Rescue
Agreement, the Liability Convention, the Registration Convention
and the Moon Treaty) and the body of customary international
law.25
Since the conclusion of the last of multilateral convention in
1979, however, the international community has been unable to
achieve any new, legally binding agreements to govern space activities (and the most recently concluded multilateral convention, the
Moon Treaty, has been ratified by only sixteen countries).26 In
place of legally binding agreements, a wide variety of non-binding
“soft law” instruments have been developed for space activities,
variously described as “non-binding principles, norms, standards
or other statements of expected behavior in the form of recommendations, charters, terms of reference, guidelines, codes of conduct, etc.”27
In light of the obstacles that have prevented states from concluding legally binding agreements to govern space activities,
See David Wright, Laura Grego & Lisbeth Gronlund, THE PHYSICS OF SPACE
SECURITY: A REFERENCE MANUAL 29, 39 –40 (2005) (describing the effects of the atmosphere on orbiting satellites).
25 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4; Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts,
the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space,
Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119; Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961
U.N.T.S. 187; Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space,
Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T.695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15; Agreement Governing the Activities
of States on the Moon & Other Celestial Bodies, Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, 18
I.L.M. 1434.
26
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Status of International
Agreements relating to Activities in Outer Space as at 1 January 2015, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/C.2/2015/CRP.8 http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/limited/c2/AC105_
C2_2015_CRP08E.pdf [https://perma.cc/CS6R-DBYU].
27
Marco Ferrazzani, Soft Law in Space Activities – An Updated View, in SOFT
LAW IN OUTER SPACE: THE FUNCTION OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL
SPACE LAW 99, 100 (ed., 2012) [hereinafter SOFT LAW IN SPACE]; see also Dinah L.
Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 291, 319 (2006)
(noting that the term "soft law" is often used to denote principles, standards, or
arrangements of a non-legally binding nature).
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some authors have suggested that soft law initiatives should be
embraced as “the best hope for pragmatic progress in a highly politically charged environment.”28 It has also been suggested that
soft law has emerged as the “most appropriate tool” for ensuring
the security of space objects and preventing an arms race in
space.29
The shocking, destructive Chinese ASAT test in 2007 inspired
the European Union to develop a soft law instrument, a nonbinding code of conduct, to promote more responsible behavior in
space.30 The European Code of Conduct for Activities in Outer
Space was formally proposed on December 17, 2008.31 After three
subsequent revisions, the latest draft (March 31, 2014) is now referred to as the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (the “ICOC” or the “Code”).32
Invoking the benefits of soft law, many scholars, government
officials and other commentators support the adoption of the Code
and consider it (or similar codes) to be the right step forward in
order to ensure more-responsible behavior in space.33 Toward this
28 See, e.g., Ben Baseley-Walker, Analysing International Reactions to Soft Law
Initiatives on Space Security, in SOFT LAW IN SPACE, supra note 27, at 387, 394.
29 See, e.g., Fabio Tronchetti, A Soft Law Approach to Prevent the Weaponisation
of Outer Space, in SOFT LAW IN SPACE, supra note 27, at 361, 372.
30 Jana Robinson, Europe’s Space Diplomacy Initiative: The International Code of
Conduct, in DECODING THE INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR OUTER SPACE
ACTIVITIES 27 (Ajey Lele ed., 2012) [hereinafter DECODING THE CODE] (“The code
was largely stimulated by the troubling display of non-transparency and insensitivity to the space environment shown by China in its 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT)
test”).
31 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions and Draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, Annex II, ST 17175 2008 INIT (Dec. 17, 2008), available
at
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2017175%
202008%20INIT [https://perma.cc/5Y6Q-MVQV].
32 Council of the European Union, Version March 31, 2014, Draft International
Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, available at http://
www.eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-disarmament/pdf/space_code_
conduct_draft_vers_31-march-2014_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/PL6S-FPCV] [hereinafter Code]. Previous revised versions were proposed on October 11, 2010, and
September 16, 2013.
33 See, e.g., Press Statement, Sec’y of State Clinton, supra note 18 (“A Code of
Conduct will help maintain the long-term sustainability, safety, stability, and security of space by establishing guidelines for the responsible use of space.”); Victoria Samson, The ICoC: A Starting Point, in AWAITING LAUNCH: PERSPECTIVES ON
THE DRAFT ICOC FOR OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES 69, 69–74 (Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan & Daniel A. Porras eds., 2014) [hereinafter AWAITING LAUNCH] (“While
the ICoC is not perfect, it is an excellent start to the conversation on what major
space stakeholders believe to be responsible use of space . . . .”); Park Won-hwa,
Space Code of Conduct: Right Step Forward Although not Perfect, in DECODING THE
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end, the Code employs its own soft law approach to address numerous issues, including those found in two related but very different subject matter areas: the critical problem of orbital space debris and the challenge of preventing an arms race in space. The
Code unfortunately fails in its attempts to achieve progress in either of these areas and instead undermines such efforts.
While various soft law instruments have made positive contributions to different aspects of space law, this article argues that the
Code does not hold such promise. On the contrary, the Code is a
case study in the limitations of soft law, particularly when employed as a mechanism to regulate military activities and weapons
in a highly insecure environment. Moreover, it is notably ill-suited
in this context and in its design to successfully address the critical
problem of orbital space debris. As an instrument with soft law’s
limitations and its own particular shortcomings, the Code is thus
an ineffective and distracting measure that risks increasing tensions in space while diminishing existing and future space regimes.
The article is organized as follows. Part 2 briefly discusses the
ascendance of soft law as a design choice in building international
regimes, and the important role that it has played in the formation
of space law and regulatory frameworks related to space activities.
Next, this part concisely reviews the Code framework, particularly
as it relates to military and security concerns and the promotion of
arms control objectives.
Part 3 presents the argument that soft law is generally a problematic design choice for arms control initiatives and is illequipped to address contentious security issues in an unstable geopolitical environment. The argument proceeds by analyzing the
negative effects of soft law design choices that weaken instruments, such as the Code, along the dimensions of precision and obligation. The impact of these design choices on compliance may
also vary with respect to the political systems that embrace them,
raising questions about possible disadvantages for democratic
states (and their open societies) when they undertake in good faith
to implement politically significant but legally non-binding arms
control commitments.
Part 4 carries the analysis one step further, arguing that the
Code is a particularly problematic soft law variant for addressing
critical space problems, notably space debris. In advancing this arCODE, supra note 30, at 101, 103 (describing the Code, in spite of its limitations, as
a “positive milestone for humankind”).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss2/2

2017]

CODE OF CONDUCT FOR OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES

345

gument, central features of the Code are assessed, including the
manner in which this diplomatically-driven, or “top-down” soft
law instrument is layered upon current, more effective “bottomup” soft law initiatives, creating a counterproductive and confusing “soft-on-soft law” phenomenon. Furthermore, as a practical
matter, the Code has failed to attract the support of several key
spacefaring states, raising the prospect of a fractional soft law variant that is unable to address key security issues and instead risks
increasing tensions in space.
The Code presents one last intriguing soft law predicament
based on its promotion as a “non-binding” yet “norm-creating” instrument. As a legally non-binding document, the Code skirts legislative participation in subscribing democratic states where legislatures normally approve, authorize or otherwise participate in the
conclusion of legally binding agreements. To the extent that the
Code, along with subsequent state practice, generates new legally
binding norms of customary international law, it would thus enlarge a “democracy deficit” in the formation of those rules and
could have far-reaching negative consequences. The Code’s heralded non-binding yet norm-creating status has given rise to an
unprecedented conflict between the executive and legislative
branches in the United States. This conflict threatens to undermine
not only U.S. support for the Code, but also the leading role that
the United States has played in the development of space law since
the beginning of the space era.
Part 5 offers some thoughts on principles to guide states as they
take the next step in developing new instruments to better address
the critical threat posed by space debris while also grappling with
separate but closely related security and arms control issues in
space. Finally, Part VI concludes with reflections on the most serious problems confronting the international community in space
and how the Code unfortunately represents more of an obstacle
than a meaningful solution to these problems.
2. THE ASCENDANCE OF SOFT LAW AND ITS ROLE IN OUTER SPACE

2.1. Choosing Soft Law
In contrast to the protracted negotiations that are often re-
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quired to conclude legally binding agreements, the process associated with developing soft law has been described as a faster and
easier alternative for states to address shared problems and overcome political obstacles.34 One common explanation for the ease
with which states are able to conclude soft law instruments is the
flexibility afforded by soft law, an attribute that some authors also
suggest is particularly useful for dealing with the challenges of
space.35
Soft law instruments may thus enjoy the benefits of great flexibility and may be concluded quickly through a variety of methods,
particularly by employing indeterminate terms that help avoid
lengthy debates about controversial key phrases and definitions.36
Vague, ambiguous, imprecise, or otherwise indeterminate language used in international instruments is often categorized by
scholars as a form of “soft law.”37 Soft law documents may thus
take many forms as they are weakened along one or more dimensions, including obligation and precision.38
34
Christian Olarean, Cyber Threats to Space Systems, in AWAITING LAUNCH,
supra note 33, at 101, 104 (noting how non-legally binding tools and frameworks
provide greater flexibility than binding treaties and permit timely movement towards solutions on issues “where political obstacles can make the negotiation of
legal instruments a protracted process.”); Ferrazzani, supra note 27, at 105 (arguing that soft law instruments “foster international cooperation by offering simper,
faster and more flexible terms”).
35 Ferrazzani, supra note 27, at 117 (describing the practice of soft law as “[a]
virtuous system that is flexible, corresponding to the needs of the space community . . . ”).
36 Wolfgang Rathgeber et al., Space security and the European Code of Conduct
for Outer Space Activities, 4 UNIDIR DISARMAMENT F. 33, 34 (2009), available at
http://www.unidir.org/files/ publications/pdfs/a-safer-space-environment-en325.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2LR-GBQS] (noting that “because it constitutes soft
law, a code of conduct is easier to agree to and potentially avoids lengthy discussions about definitions . . . ”).
37 See, e.g., Shelton, supra note 27, at 319 (noting that “[t]he term ‘soft law’ is
also sometimes employed to refer to the weak, vague, or poorly drafted content of
a binding instrument”); Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International
Law?, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 414–15 n.7 (1983) (stating that “[i]t would seem better
to reserve the term 'soft law' for rules that are imprecise and not really compelling”); Edith Brown Weiss, Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH
NONBINDING ACCORDS 1, 3 (Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1997) (noting that soft law can
also refer to hortatory language).
38 See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 422 (Summer 2000) (emphasizing that ‘soft law’ begins once legal arrangements are weakened along one or more of the dimensions
of obligation, precision, and delegation.”); R. R. Baxter, International Law in “Her
Infinite Variety," 29 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 549, 549–566 (Oct., 1980) (suggesting that
"soft law" can manifest itself in an "infinite variety" of forms).
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Although soft law instruments are often characterized by diminished obligations (since they are legally non-binding documents) and/or imprecise language, they may nonetheless be able
to significantly influence the behavior and conduct of states.39
Scholars who describe the benefits of soft law point, in particular,
to the ability of soft law instruments to help states and international organizations build new international norms, including new
norms of space law.40 Such capabilities are also invoked by commentators who suggest that soft law initiatives should be embraced as “a key building block for norm-setting and regulation of
the outer space environment.”41
Advocates of the Code thus argue that one of its greatest
strengths is its status as a soft law instrument, suggesting that it
“can help define responsible activities and set out agreed norms of
behaviour when legally binding agreements cannot be reached.”42
Proponents further predict that the Code will establish a solid
foundation for such progress and be able to serve as “an essential
normative instrument to harmonize the interests of space-faring
and non-space-faring countries.”43 Similarly, senior U.S. officials
Christian Brünner & Georg Königsberger, ‘Regulatory Impact Assessment’ —
A Tool to Strengthen Soft Law Regulations, in SOFT LAW IN SPACE, supra note 27, at 90;
Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1823, 1880 (2002) ("[M]any instruments that are not considered 'law' under the
classical definition have a substantial impact on the behavior of states."); NinaLouisa Remuss, Space and Security, in OUTER SPACE IN SOCIETY, POLITICS AND LAW
519, 539 (Christian Brünner & Alexander Soucek eds., 2011) (noting that even
though a code of conduct is soft law, it “can still give significant impetus to both
national and international political processes”).
40 See, e.g., OGUNSOLA O. OGUNBANWO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OUTER SPACE
ACTIVITIES 17–21 (1975) (noting how in the early space era, some non-legally binding U.N. General Assembly resolutions were widely recognized as codifying existing key international law principles while others paved the way for important
legally binding agreements or served as a source of customary international law
based on the practice of states); Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International
Environmental Law, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 259, 269 (Apr., 1992) (describing soft law solutions as "useful steps on a longer journey" and the point where "international law
and international politics combine to build new norms"); Anne-Marie Slaughter et
al., International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 367 (1998) (emphasizing the advantages of
nonbinding soft law in the context of international governance and the generation
of norms by supranational institutions and their dissemination by nongovernmental organizations).
41 See, e.g., Baseley-Walker, supra note 28, at 394.
42 See, e.g., Beatrice Fihn & Gabriella Irsten, Addressing Challenges in Space
through New Multilateral Processes, in AWAITING LAUNCH, supra note 33, at 119, 121.
43 Jessica Los Banos, EU Code of Conduct on Activities in Outer Space: Issues that
39
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now posit that “[t]he development and negotiation of a code could
play an important role in building international political consensus
and understanding around key concepts of responsible behavior.”44
2.2. The Legal Significance of Soft Law
So-called norms and standards of responsible behavior set forth
in soft law instruments are, by definition, not legally binding.45 Yet
soft law principles may nonetheless ultimately have legal significance through a variety of processes.
First, soft law principles may assist in the interpretation and
application of existing space law treaties and other obligations.46
For example, Article XII of the 1972 Liability Convention provides
that compensation be paid, by a launching state, for damages
caused by space objects, including damages caused by space objects “carrying a nuclear power source on board,” shall be “determined in accordance with international law and principles of justice and equity . . . .”47 The text of the Liability Convention,
however, is unclear whether such compensation includes reimbursement of expenses incurred for search, recovery and cleanup
operations.48
Matter, in DECODING THE CODE, supra note 30, at 97, 100; see also Olarean, supra note
34, at 104 (noting that “non-binding tools can be used as a mechanism for harmonising national laws and practices, allowing states to move towards adherence,
while keeping within their economic and technological capacities”).
44 Gregory L. Schulte [U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space
Policy] & Audrey M. Schaffer [U.S. Space Policy Advisor in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Space Policy], Enhancing Security by Promoting Responsible Behavior in Space, 6 STRATEGIC STUD. Q. 9, 14 (Spring 2012).
45 Ferrazzani, supra note 27, at 116 (referring to these non-binding principles
as “light norms”).
46 Id.; David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human
Rights, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 901, 914 (2003) (noting the impact of soft law on the interpretation of treaties and on the establishment of customary international law in
areas such as human rights).
47 G.A. Res. 47/68, Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources In
Outer Space, Principle 9 (Dec. 14, 1992) http://www.un.org/documents/
ga/res/47/a47r068.htm [https://perma.cc/8BA4-RJXW]; Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T.
2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187.
48 Faustino Pocar, The Normative Role of UNCOPUOS, in OUTLOOK ON SPACE
LAW OVER THE NEXT 30 YEARS: ESSAYS PUBLISHED FOR THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
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In order to assist in the interpretation of language in legally
binding agreements, including Article XII of the Liability Convention, states may make recourse under Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties to “any subsequent practice in
the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the
parties regarding its interpretation.”49 In the case of the Liability
Convention, such subsequent practice can be found in Principle 9.3
of the non-legally binding 1992 Declaration of Principles Relevant
to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, which provides that compensation for damage caused by space objects or
their component parts “shall include reimbursement of the duly
substantiated expenses for search, recovery and clean-up operations . . . .”50 Although this specification of reimbursable expenses
is contained in a soft law instrument, the fact that the instrument
had been adopted by all the states parties to the Liability Convention “can be regarded as an expression of subsequent practice in
the application of the Convention,” making it an authoritative basis for interpreting the Convention.51
Second, soft law instruments setting forth various technical
standards, guidelines or regulations may create obligations of a
procedural nature.52 Although these technical standards, guidelines and regulations lack legally binding force, they nonetheless
may have “factual effects.”53 For example, with respect to the
regulation of satellite networks, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) issues numerous recommendations and other
decisions which are non-binding, but states may find themselves
forced to comply with these recommendations and decisions “due

OUTER SPACE TREATY 415, 420 (Daphné Crowther & Gabriel Lafferranderie eds.,
1997).
49 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31.3.b, entered into force Jan.
27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
50 Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, supra
note 47, Principle 9.3.
51 Pocar, supra note 48, at 420 (noting that declarations of principles on outer
space “adopted by the General Assembly play a significant role within treaty law,
despite their non-binding nature, as far as they contribute to clarify the scope of
rights and obligations expressed in treaties and conventions”).
52 Ferrazzani, supra note 27, at 116.
53 Christian Brünner & Georg Kőnigsberger, ‘Regulatory Impact Assessment’—
A Tool to Strengthen Soft Law Regulations, in SOFT LAW IN SPACE, supra note 27, at 87,
89 (further noting that “the decisive factor is not the form of regulation, but the
‘substance’ and the intention to regulate and influence behavior and conduct”).
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to pure necessity of compliance.”54 Non-compliance could in fact
“lead to severe consequences up to complete isolation from the
‘telecommunication-world’ due to non-matching standards or outdated equipment.”55 (ITU recommendations and regulations also
help to illustrate the first point noted above, since they have enjoyed legal significance when employed as supplementary means
of interpretation by arbitral tribunals and other adjudicating bodies, including World Trade Organization adjudicating bodies.) 56
Third, soft law instruments setting forth various technical
standards, guidelines or regulations can lead to harmonized international procedural standards that in turn may generate legally
binding domestic legislation and regulations (including domestic
licensing requirements and other administrative procedures).57 In
the area of space law, such soft law procedural initiatives have
clearly served as an incentive for states to create coordinated national space legislation and regulations.58 For example, the 1986
U.N. General Assembly Resolution on “Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space” has played such a
role.59 Although this resolution is non-binding, its principles are
widely accepted and have been incorporated in the legally binding
domestic licensing regulations of numerous states.60 They are thus
54 Jens Hinricher, The Law-Making of the International Telecommunication Union
(ITU) – Providing a New Source of International Law?, 64 HEIDELBERG J. OF INT’L L.
489, 499, 500 (2004) (further noting that because of the complicated underlying
technical issues and the ITU’s general reputation for expertise and accuracy, the
“non-binding decisions of the ITU are commonly accepted by its members as if
they were binding”).
55 Id. at 499.
56 Yusuf Aksar, International Economic Law, in IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW: THROUGH DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS 1, 41–42 (Yusuf Aksar
ed., 2011) (“[R]egulations and recommendations of ITU . . . can be treated as the
best fitting soft law instruments in international law”).
57 Setsuko Aoki, The Function of ‘Soft Law’ in the Development of International
Space Law, in SOFT LAW IN SPACE, supra note 27, at 57, 63 (noting that the “subcategory” of “soft law for the harmonization of national laws” includes “the tacit understanding . . . that soft law should remain as a standard for the elaboration of
national law”).
58 Ferrazzani, supra note 27, at 117.
59 Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space, U.N
Doc. A/RES/41/65 (Dec. 3, 1986).
60 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, A Brief Overview of
Norms Development in Outer Space, 3 (2012), http://www.unidir.org/
files/publications/pdfs/a-brief-overview-of-norms-development-in-outer-spaceen-462.pdf [https://perma.cc/37YL-G229] (“The Remote Sensing Principles have
also been incorporated into numerous national, regional, and multilateral laws
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recognized, for the most part, as international obligations in the
U.S. space regulatory regime, which requires those persons licensed to operate any private remote-sensing space system to
comply with key principles set forth in the resolution.61
Fourth, soft law instruments seeking to frame new norms of
cooperation may later form the basis of legally binding international agreements.62 This phenomenon was notably demonstrated
in the early era of space exploration when several key principles
set forth in non-binding U.N. General Assembly Resolutions were
subsequently codified in legally binding multilateral agreements
governing activities in space.63 For example, the foundational
“non-appropriation principle,” barring states from claiming sovereignty over outer space and celestial bodies, was first expressed in
a U.N. General Assembly Resolution in 1961 and subsequently
formed the basis of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.64
Fifth, specific provisions in a soft law instrument may eventually crystallize into rules of customary international law.65 Several
U.N. General Assembly resolutions conspicuously served this purpose early in the space era.66 Widely accepted non-binding techand policies, including those of France, Japan, India, Thailand, and the United
States of America”).
61 Michael Hoversten, U.S. National Security and Government Regulation of
Commercial Remote Sensing from Outer Space, 50 A.F. L. Rev. 253, 263–64 (2001).
Under U.S. law, no person subject to U.S. jurisdiction may directly or indirectly
operate any private remote-sensing space system without first obtaining the appropriate license from the Department of Commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 5601 (1992); see
also, JULIAN HERMIDA, LEGAL BASIS FOR A NATIONAL SPACE LEGISLATION 96 (2004)
(noting that the requirements to obtain a license to operate private remote sensing
space systems include “observ[ing] the international obligations of the United
States”).
62 Ferrazzani, supra note 27, at 116–117 (noting how soft law may help in “the
process of early elaboration of detailed obligations to be subsequently formalised
under the law of international agreements”).
63 OGUNBANWO, supra note 40, at 17–21.
64 G.A. Res. 1721 (XVI) A, International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space (Dec. 20, 1961); Steven Freeland, The Role of ‘Soft Law’ in Public International Law and its Relevance to the International Legal Regulation of Outer Space, in
SOFT LAW IN SPACE, supra note 27, at 9, 26 (further noting that the nonappropriation principle may have achieved the status of a rule of customary international law even before the adoption of the General Assembly Resolution 1721
and the conclusion of the Outer Space Treaty).
65 Christine M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in
International Law, 38 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 850, 857 (Oct., 1989); see also Freeland, supra note 64, at 26 (also noting that soft law provisions “may even be declaratory of
customary international law in certain circumstances”).
66 Vereshchetin & Danilenko, infra note 286, at 25 (noting that “[t]he accelera-
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nical standards, guidelines and other regulations, such as ITU decisions and recommendations, may also be cited as evidence of general state practice, helping to potentially shape and form rules of
customary international law.67 Soft law’s role in sometimes contributing to the formation of customary international law has thus
been an important factor in the development of space law, and
proponents of the Code point to the likelihood (in their view) of
provisions in the Code eventually becoming binding rules of customary international law.68
Each legally significant process and aspect of soft law has
been reflected in important ways in the development of the legal
framework that now governs activities in space. Soft law is thus a
long established, vital component of the space law regime and
there is an increasing tendency of the international community to
rely on soft law instruments to assist in numerous areas of space
activity.69 It should be noted, however, that not all soft law intion of the formation of customary principles relating to outer space was brought
about not only by the fact that all actions of states in the field of exploration and
use of outer space were immediately known all over the world, but also by the
adoption of a number of United Nations General Assembly resolutions”). It
should be noted, however, that the U.N. General Assembly has the power only to
make “recommendations to the . . . Members of the United Nations.” U.N. Charter
art. 63, ¶ 2. In order to form the basis of customary international law, such resolutions must purport to state legal principles, enjoy a very high degree of consensus,
and be reflected in the subsequent general practice of states acting out of a sense
of legal obligation. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §103 cmt.
c (1987) (observing that resolutions of universal organizations, “if not controversial and if adopted by consensus or virtual unanimity, are given substantial
weight” in the identification of international law); Id. at §103 Reporters Note 2
(observing that “[e]ven a unanimous resolution may be questioned when the record shows that those voting for it considered it merely a recommendation or a political expression, or that serious consideration was not given to its legal basis. A
resolution is entitled to little weight if it is contradicted by state practice . . . ”).
67
Hinricher, supra note 54, at 499–501 (noting that the ITU is involved “in
reshaping and supplementing international law” and that “the overall compliance
of states with non-binding recommendations issued by international organisations such as the ITU can . . . slowly evolve into binding customary rules and
practices”).
68
Remuss, supra note 39, at 539; Los Banos, supra note 43, at 100 (arguing
that the Code “will lay the groundwork to transform commitments into legally
binding obligations either through the enactment of a treaty or their crystallization into customary international law in the future”).
69 Ferrazzani, supra note 27, at 117 (“Whatever the history of space law may
tell, soft law is already there, non-legally binding but vital, helping significantly in
the establishment and development of international space relations.”); Freeland,
supra note 64, at 25–26 (“There is a clear trend towards the use of such [soft law]
instruments, continuing the long-established understanding that soft law is a
well-accepted methodology for furthering . . . endeavors in outer space”).
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struments lead to the formation of new rules of customary international law or serve as the basis for new legal regimes. In some cases, these instruments may be illusory achievements, presenting
“only the appearance of genuine agreement and shared understanding when in fact there is none.”70 In addressing arms control
and security issues, these instruments may also create their own
problems, thus causing more harm than good (as discussed below
in Part 3).
2.3. Soft Law as the Proposed Solution for Space: The Code
In recent years, several diplomatically-driven soft law initiatives related to space activities have received considerable attention at the United Nations. For example, since 2005, the U.N. General Assembly has promoted the development and adoption of socalled “Outer Space Transparency and Confidence-Building
Measures” (TCBMs).71 As part of these efforts, a Governmental
Group of Experts (GGE) was formed in 2011 with the mandate “to
conduct a study . . . on outer space transparency and confidencebuilding measures” and submit a final report to the General Assembly.72 In late 2013, the General Assembly received and endorsed the final GGE report and encouraged U.N. Member States
to review and implement the proposed soft law measures through
relevant national mechanisms on a voluntary basis.73
The EU’s development of an international code of conduct for
70 RICHARD B. BILDER, MANAGING THE RISKS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, 38
(1981) (noting how commentators have observed that some soft law techniques,
such as the employment of equivocal or ambiguous language, may result in
agreements that are “wholly illusory and not useful”).
71 Since 2005, the U.N. General Assembly has annually adopted resolutions
promoting TCBMs. These efforts have enjoyed the strong support of many governments, particularly the Russian Federation. See Department of Security Affairs
and Disarmament & Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Russian Approaches towards Ensuring Security in Space, in DECODING THE CODE, supra
note 30, at 117.
72
G.A. Res. A/65/68, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/68, Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities (Jan. 13, 2011), available at
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/65/68
[https://perma.cc/8E4X-D2AZ].
73
G.A. Res. 68/50, U.N. Doc A/RES/68/50, Transparency and ConfidenceBuilding Measures in Outer Space Activities (Dec. 10, 2013), available at
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?
symbol=A/RES/68/50
[https://perma.cc/2KVG-SHVM].
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outer space is not directly related to GGE activities,74 although the
Code does contain several voluntary TCBMs similar to those recommended by the GGE in its final report. These include provisions encouraging states to endeavor to organize the following activities on a voluntary basis: familiarization visits to improve
understanding of a state's policies and procedures for outer space
activities; expert visits to space launch sites, flight control centers,
and other outer space infrastructure facilities; observations of
launches of space objects; demonstrations of rocket and other
space-related technologies; dialogues to clarify information on outer space activities; and thematic workshops and conferences on the
exploration and use of outer space.75
The Code, however, contains more than just traditional TCBMs
like those recommended by the U.N. General Assembly. The latest
draft of the Code is subdivided into four sections (Core Principles
and Objectives, General Measures, Cooperation Mechanisms, and
Organizational Aspects) and its stated purpose is “to enhance the
safety, security, and sustainability of all outer space activities pertaining to space objects, as well as the space environment.”76 To
achieve these goals, states subscribing to the Code resolve to perform a variety of actions, including notifying other subscribing
states of designated space activities (without distinction as to their
military or civilian nature), including pre-notification of the launch
of space objects and scheduled maneuvers that could pose a risk to
the safety of flight of the space objects of other States.77
States further resolve, pursuant to the Code, to annually share
information with the other subscribing states related to their
“space strategies and policies, including those which are securityrelated, in all aspects which could affect the safety, security, and
sustainability in outer space” as well as their “major outer space
research and space applications programmes.”78 Good faith efforts
74 Although the General Assembly resolution endorsing the final GGE report
explicitly recognized “the presentation by the European Union of a draft of a nonlegally binding international code of conduct for outer space activities,” the Code
has proceeded on a sometimes parallel—but separate—track. Id.
75 Code, supra note 32, art. 6.4.
76
Id., art. 1.1. Art. 1.3 further provides that “[t]his Code establishes transparency and confidence-building measures, with the aim of enhancing mutual
understanding and trust, helping both to prevent confrontation and foster national, regional and global security and stability . . . .”
77 Id., art. 5.1.
78 Id., art. 6.1.
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to fully implement such provisions on notification and sharing of
information may raise serious issues for the military agencies of
some spacefaring countries, particularly with respect to divulging
information relating to their sensitive technology and national security.79
Other provisions in the Code, which could be interpreted to restrict specific military activities and programs, raise additional national security concerns for some states. For example, the Code
contains five different provisions related to a subscribing state’s responsibility to prevent “harmful interference” to another state’s
space activities and objects, including section 4.1 in which subscribing states “resolve to establish and implement policies and procedures to minimize . . . any form of harmful interference with another State’s peaceful exploration, and use, of outer space.”80
The Code, however, does not define the broad term “harmful
interference,” (which could encompass diverse types of actions
causing direct, indirect, or temporary effects), nor does it make any
distinction between military and civilian activities that might cause
such harmful interference. While the elusive, undefined term
harmful interference is found in several agreements relating to
space, it is used in those agreements in much more limited contexts
than as a comprehensive prohibition of all forms of harmful interference with space objects.81
79
Ajey Lele, Deliberating the Space Code of Conduct, in DECODING THE CODE,
supra note 30, at 13, 20 (“No state would like to share technical information which
could be used to understand, and probe more deeply into, its scientific and technological capabilities”).
80 Code, supra note 32, § 2. (¶¶ 25 and 27), 4.1, 6.1 and 7.1.
81 See, e.g., Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. IX (authorizing a state party
to request consultation when there is reason to believe that the activity of another
state party or its nationals would cause potentially harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space); see also David A.
Koplow, An Inference About Interference: A Surprising Application of Existing International Law to Inhibit Anti-Satellite Weapons, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 737, 781–793, 815
(2014) (cataloguing agreements that contain references to interference and noting
in particular how various defunct and extant U.S.-Russia bilateral arms control
treaties contain provisions that prohibit interference with “National Technical
Means” or “NTM” spy satellites which are used to verify compliance with treaty
commitments). Although Professor Koplow propounds a thesis that a test or use
in space of a debris-creating ASAT would be illegal under existing international
law because it would result in a dangerous, persistent debris stream that would,
at some point, “impermissibly interfere with the operation of treaty-protected
NTM satellites,” he notes that at this time “there are simply not enough treaties
containing the explicit NTM provisions to create [on that basis alone] a truly comprehensive, global restriction on ASAT activities.”
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The absence of any definitions of key terms in the Code (including the term harmful interference) is recognized even by proponents of the Code as a significant failure.82 Critics of the Code
(including numerous members of the U.S. Congress) argue that
good faith efforts to fully implement its broad terms could have
far-reaching negative consequences for U.S. military and intelligence activities and programs in space.83
Several countries have questioned whether the Code is an appropriate mechanism to address the military aspects of outer space,
an area that has traditionally been reserved for deliberations by the
U.N. Conference on Disarmament (the CD) and its Prevention of
an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) process.84 Russia in particular has sought to distance the proposed Code from the PAROS
process and has refrained from supporting the Code, preferring instead its own proposed legally-binding international agreement
(submitted jointly with the government People’s Republic of China
to the CD), entitled the “Draft Treaty on the Prevention on the
Placement of Weapons in Outer Space” (the PPWT).85
82 See Tronchetti, supra note 29, at 361, 377 (while viewing the Code as a step
in the right direction, the author notes that the absence of any definition of key
terms is a “negative aspect” of the Code, one which “may lead to uncertainties in
the interpretation and application of its provisions”).
83
Letter from Thirty-Seven Senators to Hillary Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State
(Feb. 2, 2011) (on file with author) (describing the Code as a “multilateral commitment with a multitude of potential highly damaging implications for sensitive
military and intelligence programs (current, planned or otherwise,) . . . ”).
84
Mohamed Hatem Elatawy, ICoC: Recommendations for Further Elaboration,
in AWAITING LAUNCH, supra note 33, at 45, 49 (“[A] number of countries question
the prerogative of this Code to deal with the military aspects of outer space, an
area that has traditionally been reserved to the CD [Conference on Disarmament]”). Since the CD established the Ad Hoc Committee on PAROS (now defunct) in 1985, arms control initiatives have been a regular feature of CD discussions, although a common approach regarding a legally binding PAROS
instrument has been not been achieved. See Paul Meyer, The Conference on Disarmament and the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, 6,
http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/the-conference-ondisarmament-and-the-prevention-of-an-arms-race-in-outer-space-370.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N3QC-YE7L] (“The consideration of outer space from an arms
control and disarmament perspective has a long pedigree at the CD”).
85 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, supra note 71, at
118 (noting how Russia has insisted on differentiating between the subject matter
and legal basis of the PPWT and Code, and has argued that the drafting of the
Code “must not undermine our efforts aimed at elaborating the PPWT”). The first
draft of the PPWT was proposed on Feb. 29, 2008. See Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against
Outer Space Objects, Conference on Disarmament, CD 1839, Feb. 29, 2008,
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/PPWT.pdf
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The relevance of the Code to military activities in space is nonetheless clear, having been originally developed, as noted, in response to the 2007 Chinese ASAT test.86 Although the Code is not
stylized as an arms control initiative and does not explicitly prohibit any military technologies in space, it nonetheless is designed
to be a “comprehensive” proposal which is intended “to establish
norms of behaviour for all space activities, both in the civilian and
military domains of outer space.”87 The text of the Code notes “the
importance of preventing an arms race in outer space” and “the responsibility of States, in the conduct of scientific, civil, commercial
and military activities, to promote the peaceful exploration and use
of outer space for the benefit, and in the interest, of humankind
and to take all appropriate measures to prevent outer space from
becoming an arena of conflict.”88
In spite of the limitations of soft law, numerous commentators
argue that the Code, as a soft law initiative, is the “first step towards addressing the global security concerns caused by our increased presence in outer space.”89 A similar, favorable view of a
non-binding code of conduct for outer space activities is also generally reflected in current U.S. Department of Defense policies. For
example, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs noted in 2012 that the European Union’s draft plan was “a promising
[https://perma.cc/6G4T-RZ6X]. The latest draft PPWT was proposed on Sept. 3,
2015. See Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space
and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects, Conference on Disarmament, CD 1985, June 12, 2014, Art. I.b, available at http://
reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/cd/2014/
documents/PPWT2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7W3-9T78].
86 Kazuto Suzuki, ICoC and the Right of Self Defense, in AWAITING LAUNCH, supra note 33, at 87, 90 (“[T]he ICoC was developed as a response to the Chinese
ASAT test in 2007. The ASAT test created a large cloud of space debris that would
increase the risk of collision with their space assets. This sort of intentional creation of debris for any purpose was unacceptable for many countries”).
87
Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan & Daniel A. Porras, Preface to AWAITING
LAUNCH, supra note 33, at 1 (“The ICoC is a comprehensive proposal, trying to establish norms of behaviour for all space activities, both in the civilian and military
domains of outer space.”); Code, supra note 32, Preamble, ¶ 13 (“[r]ecognizing the
necessity of a comprehensive approach to safety, security, and sustainability in
outer space . . . ”).
88 Code, supra note 32, Preamble ¶ 6 and art. 2 (emphasis added).
89 Beatrice Fihn & Gabriella Irsten, Addressing Challenges in Space through New
Multilateral Processes, in AWAITING LAUNCH, supra note 33, at 119, 120 (further noting that the ICoC is “an example of a recent trend in security policies, to move beyond deadlocked forums and traditional framing of problems, to encouraging
creative thinking and alternative methods of moving forward”).
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basis for an international code,” and that “[a]n international code
of conduct can enhance U.S. national security by encouraging responsible space behavior by reducing the risk of mishaps, misperceptions and mistrust.”90
Soft law is not, however, a panacea for the problems of space,
particularly those related to security. As discussed below, soft law
instruments have fundamental limitations in addressing security
matters, particularly in unstable geopolitical environments. Further, they risk increasing tensions and undermining meaningful legal constraints.
3. SOFT LAW: A PROBLEMATIC DESIGN CHOICE FOR ARMS CONTROL
INITIATIVES

3.1. The Challenges of Arms Control
The concept of arms control encompasses a wide variety of
measures that rival states may undertake to achieve diverse objectives, including: mutually reducing levels of armaments; eliminating entire classes of weapon systems; restricting or regulating military activities which increase the risk of accidents or conflict;
increasing predictability in relations between hostile states; reducing fears about the intentions of potential adversaries; and, preempting the development or deployment of new types of weapons.91
Varied bilateral and multilateral instruments that are intended
to serve as arms control measures between adversary states must,
however, overcome many hurdles to be established and face severe
challenges in functioning effectively. This is particularly true in
the domain of space, where conditions encouraging an arms race
90
Lisa Daniel, Defense, State Agree to Pursue Conduct Code for Outer Space,
DOD NEWS (Jan. 18, 2012), http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?
id=66833 [https://perma.cc/SGH3-K9MW]; see also DOD Fact Sheet: International
Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, 2011, DEFENSE.GOV, http://
archive.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0111_nsss/docs/FINAL_DoD_Fact_
Sheet_International_Code-2012_1-17-12.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q6NR-4NGR]
(last visited July 13, 2015) (stating that “[a]n international Code of Conduct can
enhance U.S. national security”).
91
JOZEF GOLDBLAT, ARMS CONTROL: THE NEW GUIDE TO NEGOTIATIONS AND
AGREEMENTS 10–11 (2002).
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abound. Fears, suspicions and accusations about new space weapon systems and military space projects continue to multiply, as evidenced particularly by the growing concerns expressed by Russia
and China on the one hand, and by America on the other, about
each other’s space programs.
Such fears and suspicions can contribute to the classic “security
dilemma,” in which actions taken by a state intended to be defensive in nature are instead perceived by other states as aggressive or
threatening, producing unintended and undesired consequences.92
Arms races are “only the most obvious manifestation” of the resulting downward spiral of these misperceptions.93 Predictable
and yet unnecessary counter-measures may thus be taken by
“threatened” states (for example, as U.S. rivals are developing their
own responses to a spaceplane like the X-37B), causing further insecurity and fueling more dangerous and expensive arms races in
space.94
The classic security dilemma is made even more acute in space
because a state may feel threatened by an adversary’s development
and deployment of technologies that are dual-use in nature, meaning that they can be readily employed for both civilian and military
uses.95 The abundance of dual-use technologies in space may thus
further obscure an adversary's real intentions and make it even
more difficult to distinguish between defensive and offensive postures (and the possibility that new, devastating military advantages have been achieved).
In this extremely challenging space environment, one which is
characterized by high risk and great insecurity, states struggle to
achieve arms control agreements and other collaborative security
measures. Because the stakes in international politics are typically
so high (implicating a state’s survival or extinction), the fear of exploitation is likely to motivate a state to follow its “dominant strategy,” i.e., cheating or defecting, in the absence of any genuine col92
ROBERT JERVIS, PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
66 (1976) (further quoting Herbert Butterfield as positing that the security dilemma is an “absolute predicament” that “lies in the very geometry of human conflict”).
93 Id.
94
Id.; US X-37B Spurs China to Seek Countermeasures: Russian Expert,
CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE
MONITOR,
www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclasscnt.aspx?id...cid=1101.
95 JAMES CLAY MOLTZ, CROWDED ORBITS: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN SPACE
12 (2014) (noting that an “essential fact” of space technology is “its dual-use nature”).
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laborative agreement.96 It is thus not surprising that arms control
agreements are “highly institutionalized,” with implementing regimes that “are continually concerned with compliance and policing,” and “specify verification and monitoring procedures.”97
For example, the START I Treaty98 established an elaborate and
effective verification regime that allowed the parties to remain confident in each other’s compliance with obligations related to the
reduction of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles.99 The regime
provided numerous methods (including mandatory on-site inspections) for the parties to gather and confirm needed information
about the other party’s treaty-limited forces.100 It also prohibited
each party from interfering with the other party’s treaty-related
surveillance and monitoring capabilities, so-called “National Technical Means” (principally spy satellites), and established the Joint
Compliance and Inspection Commission for the discussion of treaty implementation issues and compliance questions.101
While verification, monitoring, compliance and policing activities are routinely associated with effective arms control regimes, all
these features depend on an even more fundamental, underlying
attribute: the nature of the commitment. The nature of commitments in international instruments may, however, be dramatically
altered by soft law design choices.
A common virtue often attributed to soft law instruments is the
ease with which states are able to conclude them (compared with
the lengthier and more difficult process associated with hard law
agreements). In negotiating the design of international instru96 ARTHUR A. STEIN, WHY NATIONS COOPERATE: CIRCUMSTANCE AND CHOICE IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 40 (1993) (further describing arms control agreements
as “notoriously problematic”).
97 Id.
98 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,
U.S.-U.S.S.R., art. III, ¶¶ 9, 6, 4, July 31, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102–20 (1991).
99 GOLDBLAT, supra note 91, at 91 (“[The START I Treaty] provided each side
with transparency and predictability with regard to the strategic nuclear programmes of the other side . . . .”); see also Allan S. Krass, The People, the Debt, and
Mikhail, 47 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 12, 13 (November 1991) (noting that the verification provisions in START I treaty “were elaborate, comprehensive, and intrusive beyond the dreams of even the most idealistic disarmer of the 1950s”).
100 AMY F. WOOLF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40084, STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL AFTER
START: ISSUES AND OPINIONS 6–9 (March 4, 2010); Goldbatt, supra note 100, at 91
(noting that the START I Treaty was credited with “institutionaliz[ing] unprecedentedly extensive and intrusive measures of verification”).
101 Id.
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ments, states may consider numerous “systemic trade-offs” in substance, structure and obligation.102 The results of these trade-offs
are different types of instruments which display varying degrees of
effectiveness and display different levels of difficulty to achieve.
States may choose to employ soft law design elements (such as
weakening precision and/or obligation) for many reasons.103 In
making this choice, however, states may also delay, sacrifice or
even impede meaningful progress on the issues of mutual concern
which are addressed in soft law instruments.
3.2. Soft Law Design Choice: Weakening Precision
One important soft law design choice in constructing many international instruments is the decision to employ vague, imprecise,
ambiguous or otherwise indeterminate language. Indeterminate
language may be a satisfactory design feature for some areas of international cooperation, but it is a dangerous choice for arms control regimes. The requirements typically associated with arms control regimes are well known, and one is that they “must define
cheating quite explicitly.”104 There are fundamental reasons for
this requirement.
A state contemplating foregoing the development and deployment of new weapon systems in favor of pursuing international
cooperation will be reluctant to do so if adversary states are not
part of a collaborative regime with a degree of formalization. Such
a collaborative regime “must specify what constitutes cooperation
and what constitutes cheating, and each actor must be assured of
its ability to spot immediately others’ cheating.”105 The dilemma of
See Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, AM. J.
INT’L L 581, 582 (2005) (suggesting that legality, substance, and structure can be
viewed as “distinct design elements” that should be viewed as a whole in evaluating the effectiveness of international agreements).
103
See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 38, at 423 (suggesting that a number of
variables, including “transactions costs, uncertainty, implications for national
sovereignty, divergence of preferences, and power differentials” influence which
forms of soft law are likely to be selected by states in the particular circumstances
that confront them).
104 STEIN, supra note 96, at 40.
105
Id; see also BILDER, supra note 70, at 117–118 (noting the importance of
prompt detection and clear determination of breach in order for effective riskmanagement systems. Professor Bilder further suggests that if a nation is considering violating its own obligations under an agreement, “[i]t will be less likely to
102
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common interests in this scenario, against the backdrop of perceived security threats, is often modeled in game theory as a prisoners’ dilemma in which each state actor’s dominant strategy is to
cheat (even if all actors would actually prefer arms control or disarmament over a spiraling arms race).106
It is in this context that game theorists and other writers argue
that the obligations in an arms control regime must be sufficiently
precise to ensure that actors can recognize defection.107 Elaborate
monitoring, policing and compliance verification structures in such
a regime have little value without clear obligations and the ability
to recognize cheating. Precision in individual commitments, as
well as coherence between those commitments and broader legal
principles, framed by “accepted modes of legal discourse and argument,” also assist by discouraging states from engaging in “auto-interpretation” and other opportunistic behavior regarding their
obligations.108
The lack of precision in individual commitments, which gives
rise to indeterminate normative standards, thus makes it harder for
states to know what conformity is expected and also makes it easier for states to justify noncompliance.109 Conversely, the lack of
precision may also result in uncertainty and tension as some states
attempt to assert highly restrictive interpretations of ambiguous
terms. To avoid these problems, especially in the area of arms control, a nation is likely to “seek to describe the performance expected of the other nation as clearly and precisely as possible in the
agreement.”110 Thus, in pursuing major arms control agreements
do so if it realizes that its nonperformance will be readily apparent and clearly labeled as a violation . . . .” Conversely, Bilder argues that “if the other nation believes that its obligation is ambiguous or uncertain, it will see itself as in a better
position to justify or excuse nonperformance or inadequate performance . . . ”).
106 STEIN, supra note 96, at 40.
107
See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 140 (1984)
(suggesting that recognizing defection is an important requirement in promoting
cooperation and that the “scope of sustainable cooperation can be expanded by
any improvements in the players' ability to recognize each other from the past,
and to be confident about the prior actions that have actually been taken”).
108 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 38, at 427.
109 Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT’L L.
705, 714 (1988) (“Put conversely, the more determinate the standard, the more difficult it is to resist the pull of the rule to compliance and to justify noncompliance”).
110 BILDER, supra note 70, at 118 (noting that the proposed 1979 SALT II Treaty between the United States and Soviet Union contains elaborate provisions attempting to define the obligations of each party in the most careful and precise
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with the Soviet Union, the United States “opted for increasingly
detailed agreements, on the ground that they reduce interpretative
leeway.”111
Key undefined terms in the Code, particularly the critical prohibition on harmful interference, serve as examples of the difficulties associated with using imprecise language to regulate military,
intelligence and security activities. Similarly, provisions requiring
the exchange of information related to a state’s “major outer space
research and space applications programmes” are undefined and
problematic when broadly applied to these activities.112
With respect to efforts to discern the meaning of ambiguous
language in instruments like the Code, it is also important to note
that non-legally binding, political commitments do not benefit
from the recognized legal modes of discourse that govern the interpretation of terms in legally binding international agreements
(particularly through the application of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties).113 The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties provides a comprehensive framework of rules for the observance, operation, application and interpretation of legally binding agreements, as well as rules governing their conclusion, entry into force, amendment, invalidity, termination and suspension.
Specific provisions in the Vienna Convention address all aspects of
the interpretation of legally binding agreements, including rules
for determining the meaning of language which remains ambiguous after the application of other provisions specifying the context,
materials and subsequent practice of the parties to be examined.114
No such rules exist under international law for resolving disputes
regarding the interpretation of ambiguous language in soft law instruments.
The impact of broad and ambiguous terms, particularly on regime compliance by states, should not be underemphasized.115 The
terms”).
111
ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 11 (1995) (noting in
this regard that the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty signed in 1989 “is the size of
a telephone book”).
112
CODE, supra note 32, § 6.1 (requiring Subscribing States to share this information on an annual basis with other Subscribing States “where available and
appropriate”).
113
Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, International Agreements: A Rational
Choice Approach, 44 VA. J. INT’L L.113, 129 (2003).
114 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 49, articles 31–32.
115
See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 111, at 10 (stating that “ambiguity and
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uncertainties that indeterminate language generates in the field of
arms control presents its own dangerous risks since (as discussed
above), states rely on precise language in arms control agreements
for specific purposes and fundamental reasons. The broad and
vague language found in the Code, which will be subject to varied
interpretations by states, may thus “generate more, rather than
less, tension in space.”116
In contrast to the uncertainty and non-compliance associated
with imprecise rules, it is argued that “greater clarity conduces to
compliance.”117 For example, in reviewing numerous agreements
with a high degree of specificity, Thomas Franck observed that
“the high degree of textual determinacy goes together with a high
degree of rule-conforming state behavior.”118 Determinacy in such
agreements appears to have its own “compliance pull,” while the
absence of determinacy in other agreements makes it unlikely that
states will have compunctions about non-compliance.119 Ruleconforming state behavior is thus enhanced by a rule’s determinacy, which in turn “depends upon the clarity with which it is able to
communicate its intent and to shape that intent into a specific situational command.”120
Clear and determinate rules, accompanied by rule-conforming
state practice, may ultimately give rise to legally binding rules in
customary international law and may also lay the foundation for
legally binding conventions.121 However, the indeterminate lanindeterminacy of treaty language” is one of the key circumstances “that lie at the
root of much of the behavior that may seem to violate treaty requirements”).
116 Jeff Kueter, Do We Need a Code of Conduct for Space?, GEORGE C. MARSHALL
INST.,
3–4
(Feb.
21,
2012),
http://marshall.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/09/1060.pdf [https://perma.cc/2D4W-V4GP].
117 Franck, supra note 109, at 721.
118 Id., at 719 (citing numerous examples of agreements that have a “high degree of specificity” and which are “almost invariably obeyed.” These agreements
include those establishing rules related to: protecting diplomats; the making, interpreting and obligation of treaties; jurisdiction over vessels on the high seas, and
in territorial waters and ports; jurisdiction over aircraft; copyright and trademarks; international usage of posts; telegraphs, telephones and radio waves; rules
governing embassy property; rights of passage of naval vessels in peacetime, and;
treatment of war prisoners).
119 Id., at 713–14 (further noting that “the more determinate the standard, the
more difficult it is to resist the pull of the rule to compliance and to justify noncompliance”).
120 Id., at 725.
121 See, e.g., N. Sea Cont'l Shelf Case (F.R.G./Den., F.R.G./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶
71 (noting that it is possible for an article in a convention to be viewed as
“norm-creating,” thus constituting the foundation of, or generating, a rule
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guage used in the Code provides neither clear rules nor a sound
basis for developing a legally binding regime.122 Instead, such language appears to merely mask a failure by states to agree on key
terms and definitions. It reflects their decision, one that is often
made by diplomats in contentious negotiations, to paper over their
differences in order to achieve what is sometimes referred to as
“constructive ambiguity.”123 Rather than representing a meaningful meeting of the minds, some scholars suggest that such language
merely represents a type of “deferred confrontation.”124 In the context of arms control, instruments that largely reflect the results of
deferred confrontation are neither reliable documents on which to
build legal regimes, nor do they provide assurances of any state’s
compliance with regime objectives.
In an insecure environment in which states confront evolving
threats from complex military technologies and seek to establish
arms control regimes, scholars applying game theory suggest that
defensive defections from regimes by states may be avoided by relying on both verification measures and on a “strategy of assurance.”125 Assurance devices help a state give other states confidence in its own cooperation and compliance, with the aim of
permitting each state party to adhere to the mutually preferred co-

“ which, while only conventional or contractual in its origin,” later passes “into
the general corpus of international law, and is accepted as such by the opinio
juris, so as to have become binding even for countries which have never, and do
not, become parties to the Convention.”)
122
Id. at ¶ 72 (observing in the case of a disputed term in an international
convention that the “still unresolved controversies as to the exact meaning and
scope” of the term “must raise further doubts as to the potentially norm-creating
character of the rule”).
123
Orde F. Kittrie, Intellectual Relations: More Process Than Peace: Legitimacy,
Compliance, and the Oslo Accords, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1661, 1670–71 (2003) (describing
constructive ambiguity as “the deliberate use of vague, equivocal, or ambiguous
language capable of being interpreted by each party as protecting its own interests” and how the reliance on this particular methodology as a key element in the
Oslo process peace process was counterproductive.).
124
AHARON KLIEMAN, CONSTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY IN MIDDLE EAST PEACEMAKING 54–55, 117 (1999). Professor Klieman further argues that “by leaving core
values, issues or interests vague and unsettled,” the use of ambiguous language
with respect to key issues “is guaranteed to be the source for later difficulties.” In
discussing the impact of such language on the international community, he also
questions how “intentional ambiguity” can be “reconciled with calls for transparency, candor and commitment in international relations.” Id.
125 Kenneth W. Abbott, Trust But Verify: The Production of Information in Arms
Control Treaties and Other International Agreements, CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 23 (1993).
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operative course of action.126 A state may thus provide other states
with various types of information about its own compliance as an
assurance device in arms control scenarios where the benefits of
cooperation are great, but the potential for cheating is also great
and the costs of opportunism and misplaced trust are high. In this
situation, “hard legal commitments” can serve as critical assurance
devices.127
The type of commitment that states communicate or signal to
each other in an arms control regime is fundamentally important.
Commitments made by states and intended as assurance devices
can only be effective if they are made in a credible fashion.128 Such
“credible commitments” are crucial in many aspects of contracting
theory, game theory and in high-stakes arms control scenarios
when one party relies on the future performance by others while it
complies with its own side of the bargain.129
Efforts by states to make credible commitments to other states
are fundamentally undermined when the legitimacy of those
commitments is diminished by textual indeterminacy.130 A rule
cannot be legitimate if it cannot communicate “what conduct is
permitted and what conduct is out of bounds.”131 Although states
may choose to not employ precise terms, opting instead for an easier, more flexible soft law approach by adopting an instrument
containing indeterminate language (as in the case of the proposed
Id.
Abbott & Snidal, supra note 38, at 429 (noting that “[S]tates should use
hard legal commitments as assurance devices when the benefits of cooperation are
great but the potential for opportunism and its costs are high”).
128 Abbott, supra note 125, at 23 (“[w]hat is needed to ensure continued cooperation is a way for each player to communicate its ongoing commitment to the
cooperative result in a credible fashion”).
129
Abbott & Snidal, supra note 38, at 426, 429 (further noting that “states
should use hard legalization to increase the credibility of commitments when
noncompliance is difficult to detect, as in most arms control situations”). In the
event that noncompliance is alleged, legally binding agreements (unlike soft law
instruments) are also governed by near-universally accepted rules of international
law which assist the parties in determining what constitutes a material breach and
allow any or all of them to suspend or terminate the agreement in accordance
with specified conditions. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note
49, arts. 60, 65.
130
Franck, supra note 109, at 713, 716 (noting that “[p]erhaps the most selfevident of all characteristics making for legitimacy is textual determinacy . . . [t]he
degree of determinacy of a rule directly affects the degree of its perceived legitimacy.”) (emphasis added).
131
Id. at 716 (“To be legitimate, a rule must communicate what conduct is
permitted and what conduct is out of bounds.”)
126
127
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Code), such indeterminacy has costs which are “paid for in the
coin of legitimacy.”132
Even when legally binding agreements are employed for arms
control and disarmament initiatives (as opposed to soft, voluntary,
non-binding arrangements), key indeterminate language in those
agreements can undermine their ability to communicate credible
commitments or provide security assurances.133 Each state may
possess strong incentives for surprise defection from an arms control agreement while at the same time risking great damage to its
own national security if a defection by another state occurs. In
such situations, a state may seek to maintain its own flexibility
while attempting to ensure that other states are bound by arms
limits.134
While soft law may lay the foundation for the development of
hard law regimes in other fields, in the context of arms control it
may instead merely generate new sources of uncertainty and conflict. When indeterminate language is used to establish key rules
in arms control agreements, no credible commitments are signaled
by states. Concurrently, offensive defections may be hard to identify, little assurance is signaled to prevent states from engaging in
defensive defections, and some states may become “defensive quasi-defectors” as they unilaterally interpret (in a self-serving manner) ambiguous key rules.135
3.3. Soft Law Design Choice: Weakening Obligation
Credible commitments in arms control regimes can be communicated or signaled along several “hard” dimensions. Precision is
only one of these dimensions, one that can be diminished (as discussed above) by indeterminate language. The realm of soft law
THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 53 (1990).
Jack M. Beard, The Shortcomings of Indeterminacy in Arms Control Regimes:
the Case of the Biological Weapons Convention, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 271, 275, 287–291,
294–295, 300–302 (2007).
134 Abram Chayes & Dinah Shelton, Multilateral Arms Control: Commentary, in
COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 521 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) [hereinafter
COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE].
135
Beard, supra note 133, at 289 (noting that states with the most advanced
technology can become “quasi-defectors” by exploiting the soft limits of indeterminate restrictions “through sophisticated auto-interpretation of a regime's scientific and technical requirements . . . ”).
132

133
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also includes international arrangements in which the obligation
itself is weakened by an instrument’s reduction to a legally nonbinding status. This dimension of soft law relates to the ability of a
legitimate rule in an agreement to communicate not only content,
but also authority.136 Legally binding norms thus stimulate a sense
of obligation, create a compliance pull, and derive legitimacy not
only from their form but also from the process whereby these
norms are created.137
By entering into legally binding agreements, states can raise the
credibility of their commitments by staking their “national reputation on adherence” and signaling their intentions “with special intensity and gravity.”138 Such commitments serve key functions in
arms control regimes, making it possible for states to provide assurances to each other to restrain defensive defections. As an “ex
ante sorting device,” such hard legal commitments allow genuinely
committed states to identify themselves as being willing to bear the
greater costs imposed on violators of binding legal agreements,
thus demonstrating a low propensity to defect.139
One aspect of many types of legally binding agreements that
has special significance for signaling a credible commitment and
communicating authority is the formal ratification or other approval of such agreements by the legislative body of a state. Each
country determines its own internal procedures for expressing its
consent to be legally bound by international agreements, including
what role (if any) is assigned to the national legislative body of that
country. While the words “treaty” and “international agreement”
are synonymous terms for legally binding agreements as a matter
of international law,140 in the United States the word “treaty” has a
136 Franck, supra note 109, at 725 (noting that “the legitimacy of the rule—its
ability to exert pull to compliance and to command voluntary obedience—is to be
examined in the light of its ability to communicate. In this instance, however [relating to the symbolic validation, ritual and pedigree of the rule], what is to be
communicated is not so much content as authority”).
137
Chayes & Shelton, supra note 134, at 526–27 (further arguing that “some
evidence in arms control cases supports this view, suggesting that a norm in a
treaty may induce more conforming state behavior than one that is purely nonbinding”).
138 Charles Lipson, Why Are Some International Agreements Informal? 45 INT’L
ORG. 495, 508, 511 (1991) (further noting that states use treaties to “underscore the
durability and significance of the underlying promises”).
139 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 38, at 429.
140 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 49, art.2, entered into
force Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Although the United States is not a party to
the Vienna Convention, it recognizes its substantive provisions as generally repre-
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narrower meaning which usually refers to only those legally binding international agreements which require the advice and consent
of the U.S. Senate.141
The process of legislative approval in the United States can also
be accomplished by “congressional-executive agreements,” i.e.,
agreements authorized in advance or subsequently approved by a
majority vote of each house of Congress.142 The president may also
enter into “sole executive agreements,” i.e., agreements made pursuant to the President’s constitutional authority without further
congressional authorization.143 The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently recognized the validity of properly concluded, legally
binding “executive agreements.”144 In practice, however, such
findings may be aided or supported by the implied approval of
Congress.145
Whether a treaty or executive agreement is employed, both
types of agreements result in binding obligations for the United
States under international law, with concurrent credibility and assenting customary international law. See, e.g., Fujitsu Ltd. v. Federal Exp. Corp., 247
F.3d 423 (2d Cir. 2001) (relying upon the Vienna Convention as an authoritative
guide to the customary international law of treaties).
141 U.S. CONST. art. II, §2 (providing that the President “shall have Power, by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided twothirds of the Senators present concur”).
142 MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33539, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AGREEMENTS: THEIR EFFECT UPON U.S. LAW 4–5 (2015), available at
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32528.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U92G-DGPC],
(noting also that “the great majority of international agreements that the United
States enters into are not treaties but executive agreements . . . ”).
143 Id.
144 See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (“an international
compact . . . is not always a treaty which requires the participation of the Senate”);
see also, Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003) (“our cases have recognized that the President has authority to make ‘executive agreements’ with other countries, requiring no ratification by the Senate . . . this power having been exercised since the early years of the Republic”); see also, LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 175 (1996) (“Whatever their theoretical merits, it is now widely accepted that the Congressional-Executive agreement is available for wide use, even general use, and is a complete alternative to a treaty.”)
145 See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 227–4228 (1942) (while upholding the validity of the executive agreement at issue (the “Litvinov Assignment”)
and noting that it was “part and parcel” of the President’s new policy of recognizing the Soviet Union under his constitutionally enumerated powers to “receive
ambassadors,” the Court also noted that it was part of his efforts to alleviate the
effects of Soviet nationalization of U.S. assets and that “Congress tacitly recognized that policy” through the authorization of the appointment of a Commissioner to determine the claims of American nationals against the Soviet government.).
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surance benefits for purposes of arms control regimes. Both approaches should be distinguished, however, from the proposed
Code, which will not constitute a legally binding agreement.
While non-binding arrangements are often closely associated only
with the government in power at the time such arrangements are
signed, legally binding agreements ensure that states remain
bound by the principle of pacta sunt servanda so that even if new
governments come to power, they “must perform the obligations
entered into by a previous regime.”146
In assessing the types of instruments that states may employ to
make international commitments, it is widely acknowledged that
“the treaty regime makes the government’s commitment more
credible.”147 Similarly, other types of legally binding agreements
which involve legislative approval, such as CongressionalExecutive Agreements found in the U.S. legal system, involve credible commitments similar to those signaled in the treaty-making
process. In general, countries with more difficult treaty-making
processes tend to employ those processes less frequently (and thus
conclude fewer treaties), but the commitments in those treaties are
more credible because “the cost of legislative involvement itself
communicates information about the probabilities of compliance.”148 Furthermore, in light of the power that legislatures have
in democracies to frustrate the implementation of international
agreements, the structures and processes of treaty-making (involving institutionalized legislative participation) have often been used
as a signal to communicate and reinforce the credibility of commitments to foreign countries.149
The executive leader of a state may also choose to utilize the
legislative consent process in making an international commitment
in order to send a more credible signal about that leader’s degree

146 Tom Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment, and International Law, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 707, 736 (2006) (further noting that “the
relevant unit of analysis in international law is the state, not the government”).
147 Id. at 725.
148 Id. at 743, 749 (further noting that “[i]f treaty commitments are too easy to
enter into, they may not . . . facilitate credible signals on the international plane”).
149 Jeffrey Frieden & Lisa L. Martin, International Political Economy: Global and
Domestic Interactions, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 118, 124 (Ira
Katznelson & Helen V. Milner eds., 2002) (noting that “agreements negotiated
without legislative participation may lack credibility . . . . Evidence drawn from
the United States and the EU demonstrates that the credibility of commitments
rises with institutionalized legislative participation”).
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of commitment to the treaty.150 Because legislatures have the ability to prevent the implementation of agreements through the democratic process, other states may have doubts about the ability of
the executive branch to actually fulfill a commitment without legislative approval or acquiescence.151 Just as indeterminacy undermines credible commitments with costs paid in legitimacy, the advantages of non-legal arrangements (easier and quicker
negotiation, etc.) come with costs paid in “a reduction of the information and commitment benefits that flow from legislative participation . . . .”152
For their part, the legislatures of liberal democracies may view
some matters as so serious and involving such high stakes that
they see legislative participation as necessary to convey the most
formal, legally binding and credible commitment to foreign states
(with the expectation of receiving a similar, formal, reciprocal
commitment from that foreign state). Arms control matters clearly
raise such concerns in the United States. For example, Congress
enacted a law in 1961 which continues to provide that “[n]o action
shall be taken pursuant to this chapter or any other Act that would
obligate the United States to reduce or limit the Armed Forces or
armaments of the United States in a militarily significant manner,
except pursuant to the treaty-making power of the President set
forth in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution or unless
authorized by the enactment of further affirmative legislation by

Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 113, at 126–127 (further noting that “an
executive wishing to foster successful international cooperation wil1, all things
being equal, choose a treaty with a domestic ratification process that includes legislative participation . . . . Legislative participation sends a credible signal about
the seriousness with which the president views the treaty”).
151
Ginsburg, supra note 146, at 743 (further noting that “[l]egislative involvement in treaty making communicates information to other states as to which
type of agreements will be enforced by the state and which will not. They are thus
commitment-enhancing”). Furthermore, states may be concerned about the validity of agreements which are concluded in the face of internal legislative opposition since an agreement may be invalid if the state’s consent is expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law (provided that the violation was manifest
and concerned a rule of its internal law that was of fundamental importance relating to its competence to conclude the agreement.) Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, supra note 49, art. 46.
152
JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
94 (2005) (further noting that non-legal instruments are generally less costly, less
public, and can be negotiated and concluded more quickly than legal agreements,
but that these advantages “all come at the price of a reduction in the information
and commitment benefits that flow from legislative participation . . . ”).
150
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the Congress of the United States.”153
Regardless of the manner in which they are approved or ratified, legally binding international agreements possess various benefits of legalization that further contribute to signaling a credible
commitment.154 In spite of the perceived advantages of non-legally
binding political instruments, they lack these benefits of legalization.
Unlike the political content of non-binding documents, legalization in international agreements can perform a “channeling function” by conveying the seriousness of a state’s intent to be bound,
signaling at the outset a lower probability of future violations (than
would be present without legalization).155 As discussed above, legal rules are also perceived as having their own compliance pull,
are less inclined to be diminished by auto-interpretation, and benefit from “a special set of expectations about how the agreement will
be interpreted, understood, and enforced” by virtue of the existence of a formal law of treaties as codified in the Vienna Convention.156
In the case of arms control agreements, “hard legalization,” i.e.,
the strengthening of such instruments across the dimensions of
both precision and obligation, increases the credibility of commitments and serves a particularly key function when detection of
non-compliance in some arms control regimes is hard to detect.157
153 22 U.S.C. § 2573(b). This section was amended in 1994 by Public Law No.
103-236. (This statute now complicates the signing of the ICoC by the United
States, as discussed below in Part IV.C. below.) The specific requirement in this
statute for a treaty or an authorization “by the enactment of further affirmative
legislation” appears to eliminate any actions, instruments or processes involving
only the implied approval of Congress.
154
Abbott & Snidal, supra note 38, at 428 (noting that, at the outset, “[l]egal
obligations are widely perceived as having particular legitimacy”).
155 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 152, at 98.
156 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 113, at 129 (observing that an important
difference between treaties and non-legal instruments is the role of the formal law
of treaties in the Vienna Convention, and that by becoming a party to a treaty, a
state “provokes a special set of expectations about how the agreement will be interpreted, understood, and enforced. A non-legal agreement does not create the
same expectations, because technically the Vienna Convention does not govern
such agreements”); Abbott & Snidal, supra note 38, at 429 (“Legalization entails a
special form of discourse, requiring justification and persuasion in terms of applicable rules and pertinent facts, and emphasizing factors such as text, precedents,
analogies, and practice.”)
157 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 38, at 429 (further noting that even when legal
arrangements that include centralized or decentralized monitoring provisions are
absent, “legal commitments compensate in part for the reduced likelihood of de-
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The Code possesses none of these hard law attributes or advantages. The vague provisions of the Code also do not provide a
basis for successfully generating new, legally binding rules of customary international law that would be useful for an arms control
regime (or any other regime).158
Legalization plays an important and beneficial role in many areas of international cooperation and serves a particularly crucial
function in the insecure environment of military competition and
arms control. It is thus not surprising that even commentators who
support the Code nonetheless admit that a hard law approach is
the “first and best choice” for regulating the subject matter to be
addressed by the Code.159 Along similar lines, a debate continues
among space law experts over the question of whether the Code is
a distraction from more meaningful international efforts to conclude legally binding agreements to govern critical space activities.160
Many proponents of the Code suggest that even if the negotiation and conclusion of a legally binding agreement would clearly
be preferable to a soft law approach, in the interim a soft law instrument would positively contribute to the management of the
outer space environment.161 Yet, as discussed above, soft law instruments such as the proposed Code are particularly ineffective
mechanisms in the high-stakes arena of arms control and may instead burden states with a new set of uncertainties, thus risking
greater insecurity and more tension in the volatile domain of
space—while also making the development of new hard law rules
for space activities less, not more, likely.162
tection by increasing the costs of detected violations”).
158 See, e.g., N. Sea Cont'l Shelf Case, supra note 121, at 44 (While a clear rule in
an international a document may serve as the basis for the formation of a binding
obligation or norm under customary international law, the court found that “the
very considerable, still unresolved controversies as to the exact meaning and
scope” of the rule at issue raised doubts as to “the potentially norm-creating character of the rule.”)
159
See, e.g., L.I. Juqian, Mission Completed and Mission Ahead: ICoC to the Future, in AWAITING LAUNCH, supra note 33, at 37, 43 (“[T]o cope with the challenge
of space activities, a well-recognised and concluded treaty, the ‘hard law,’ is the
best and first choice.”); see also, Arvind Gupta, Forward to DECODING THE CODE,
supra note 30, at ix, x (arguing that since a legally binding agreement is difficult to
achieve, a voluntary code of conduct is “the next best option”).
160 See, e.g., Elatawy, supra note 84, at 49.
161 Id. at 46.
162 Instruments employing ambiguous language may significantly reduce the
chance of states reaching a binding agreement since they may “relax the pressure
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3.4. Soft Law, Arms Control, and the Democracy Disadvantage
Although proponents of soft law point to the benefits and advantages of soft law, these benefits and advantages may not fall
evenly on all states undertaking arms control commitments in soft
law instruments. Soft law instruments do not contain legally binding obligations, but they can and often do convey political commitments by states. As voluntary, political undertakings, such
documents permit all participating states the same opportunity to
follow or not follow established principles without violating any
legal obligations. The practical and political impact, however, on
liberal democracies that stray (or appear to stray) from such principles may be much different than the consequences for non-liberal
or authoritarian regimes that engage in similar behavior.
The term “liberal democracy” can be defined in many ways,
denoting among other things a state with a representative government, constitutional guarantees of civil and political rights, and a
functioning judicial system dedicated to the rule of law.163 Of particular importance for purposes here is the guarantee of civil and
political rights that assures individuals, the media and private interest groups the opportunity to interact in “civil society” free of
undue interference from State organs.164
Even scholars from states with an authoritarian history and
non-liberal traditions candidly observe that a commitment to a
non-binding space code of conduct (that expresses nothing more
than a joint declaration of intent) can carry more weight in democratic nations, “where military programs and financing are transparent, and where military agencies and the military-industrial
complex are monitored by independent parliaments and civilian
on the parties to reach an agreement capable of really dealing with the problem
involved, induce false public expectations, and, when these expectations are disappointed, lead to increased conflict and more difficulty in reaching real agreement.” BILDER, supra note 70, at 1703–1704.
163
Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6
EURO. J. INT’L L. 503, 511 (1995), available at http://www.ejil.org/
pdfs/6/1/1310.pdf [https://perma.cc/TT3P-8KCU]; Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AF. 205, 206–09 (1986), available at
http://www.ir.rochelleterman.com/sites/default/files/doyle%201986.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6JS4-RA4A] (defining liberal democracies as having four major
characteristics: (1) protection of private property; (2) a market economy; (3) equality under the law and respect for human rights; and (4) a representative government deriving its authority from the consent of individuals).
164 Slaughter, supra note 163, at 511.
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groups.”165
Without similar societal conditions and monitoring by democratic institutions and independent media organizations, authoritarian leaders may thus feel free to breach any code they might
sign, “as long as their violations remain hidden from the world
community.”166 Even in the case of legally binding agreements,
any form of “societal verification” of disarmament and arms control treaties is possible “only in democracies tolerating transparency in military affairs, open discussion of security issues and unhampered activities of the mass media.”167
Since soft law
instruments like the Code do not benefit from verification regimes,
enforcement mechanisms, legally binding dispute resolution procedures or even agreed standards of interpretation, they depend
entirely on self-enforcement by subscribing states and whatever
societal verification is present in those states.
The argument here is not that liberal and non-liberal states
clearly display different levels of compliance with respect to their
international legal obligations, although some scholars have suggested (somewhat controversially) that such distinctions can be
made.168 Rather, the argument is that non-binding international instruments may be scrutinized very differently in liberal democracies than they are in authoritarian states, particularly in states
where a hospitable environment is provided for private interest
groups to freely investigate, evaluate and criticize government milSee, e.g., Alexi Arbatov & Vladimir Dvorkin, Conclusion, in OUTER SPACE:
WEAPONS, DIPLOMACY, AND SECURITY 103, 108 (Alexei Arbatov & Vladimir Dvorkin
eds., 2010). It should be noted, however, that in spite of any relative advantages
Russia might gain over the United States in subscribing to the non-binding Code,
the Russian government has refused to support the Code if it interferes with its
higher-priority: securing the adoption of its proposed PPWT agreement (jointly
proposed with China). See Draft Treaty supra note 85, and accompanying text.
166 Id.
167 Goldblat, supra note 91, at 133.
168
See, e.g., Charles A. Kupchan & Clifford A. Kupchan, Concerts, Collective
Security, and the Future of Europe, 16 INT’L SEC. 114, 115–16 (1991) ("[Sltates willing
to submit to the rule of law and civil society domestically are more likely to submit to their analogues internationally."); Slaughter, supra note 163, at 503, 511
(“[B]ehavioural distinctions between liberal democracies and other kinds of
States, or more generally between liberal and non-liberal States, cannot be accommodated within the framework of classical international law”). But see Jose
Alvarez, Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter’s Liberal Theory, 12
EURO. J. INT’L L, 183, 210 (2001), http://ejil.org/pdfs/12/2/1516.pdf
[https://perma.cc/94FW-74VD] (“[W]e still have little reason to confident that
the level of compliance across the range of subjects of covered by international obligations falls along ‘liberal/non-liberal’ lines”).
165
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itary programs and assess whether they are consistent with the
spirit of international commitments.169
The preference of authoritarian states for non-binding instruments is not, however, an absolute one. For example, in some cases, authoritarian regimes may prefer a more advantageous legally
binding agreement that clearly restricts their adversaries’ more sophisticated technology while permitting the continuing deployment of their own less sophisticated but still effective weapon systems (as seen in the case of China and Russia’s current support of
the proposed PPWT over the Code.)170
In other cases, military activities which are able to be observed
by the entire international community (particularly in space) may
result in unwanted attention and pressure from the international
community, leading authoritarian states to eschew soft law arrangements, legally binding agreements or any other instruments
that have the potential to restrict their military activities in space.171
However, in areas such as weapons research and development—
where authoritarian societies can ensure that secrecy will be more
effectively maintained and that criticism by independent actors in
their societies will be far less likely—soft law arms control arrangements may present clearer advantages over rival democratic
states.
While authoritarian states may be able to pursue space-related
169
Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L. J. 273, 369 (1997), http://
scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2659&context=faculty_
scholarship [https://perma.cc/2EL8-SHLD] (“[L]iberal democracies are likely to
provide a more hospitable environment for courts and private actors whose interests align with the promotion of a supranational rule of law and who have the
freedom to pursue those interests”).
170 See Draft Treaty supra note 85, and accompanying text.
171
See, e.g., Samson, infra note 229, at 138 (noting that several major space
powers, including the United States, have generally resisted any potential restraints on their space capabilities and that some countries “have not even developed official national space policies because they do not want limits placed on
how they utilize space in the future”). Regarding current U.S. policy, however,
the Obama Administration has indicated a willingness to consider arms control
treaties or other arrangements that would limit the development of space weapons while promoting space operations that are “conducted in ways that emphasize openness and transparency.” See William Broad & Kenneth Chang, Obama
Reverses Bush’s Space Policy, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2010, A19. On the other hand,
China has been described by space experts as being “allergic to transparency
measures.” Michael Krepon, Norm Setting for Outer Space, SPACE NEWS, Sept. 8,
2014,
http://spacenews.com/41789norm-setting-for-outer-space/
[https://
perma.cc/7NCF-34TB].
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military activities, especially space weapons research and development (R&D) programs, with a relative lack of scrutiny under a
non-binding code, liberal democracies may face serious obstacles
in pursuing similar activities that relate to military programs involving potentially restricted offensive capabilities. For this reason, some commentators argue that an instrument like the Code,
even though it is a non-binding instrument, could “exert de facto
influence on U.S. space programs.”172
R&D activities with ambiguous or multiple goals related to future military activities in space may be viewed with considerable
suspicion by interested observers in legislatures and among members of a state’s civil society, particularly if those activities are seen
as being inconsistent with the spirit or terms of international commitments. Arms control regimes that affect the future military capabilities of the most powerful states generally entail predictions
by those states about future technological developments.173 Acting
on these predictions may be complicated in democracies where
governments face public scrutiny in their selection and funding of
technological alternatives related to future military missions.174
Classified U.S military space R&D programs, including current
projects like the X-37B, continue to be the subject of media attention, analysis and speculation in the United States, but they do not
face restrictions or broad public opposition based on their violation
of U.S. laws or international obligations. Thus, within the framework of existing laws and international obligations, U.S. military
planners and researchers have considerable flexibility to pursue
diverse military projects associated with current and future security requirements and goals in space.
Predicting future military missions and associated technological requirements are perilous undertakings for governments in any
area of national security, and none may be more challenging as
172
See, e.g., Jeff Kueter, Rules of the Road in Space: Does a Code of Conduct Improve U.S. Security?, GEORGE C. MARSHALL INST.,
5 (Apr. 1, 2011),
http://marshall.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/939.pdf [https://perma.cc/
97PM-DK3Y] (arguing that it “would be difficult to foresee” the United States initiating a specific military program associated with conduct prohibited by the ICoC
“and avoiding being criticized sharply for failing to live up to the spirit of the
Code, even though those actions are allowed”).
173 Colin S. Gray, HOUSE OF CARDS: WHY ARMS CONTROL MUST FAIL 43 (1992).
174 Id. (“[A]rms Control, which entails a greater or lesser measure of technology prediction, typically has the effect for democracies of constraining the range
of choice among possible solutions to problems that are left unaddressed or underaddressed”).
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predicting future threats and programs in the vast and complex
realm of outer space.175 For this reason it is not surprising that
some members of the U.S. Congress have sharply criticized the
Code based on the “unknown consequences” that indefinite limitations under that document could have on “future military or intelligence programs.”176
A soft law instrument with broad and vague objectives that restricts future military activities may thus serve to effectively limit
some technological options available to participating democratic
states (if those states make good faith efforts to fully comply and
respect the spirit and letter of the commitments made in those instruments). Such concerns are reflected in the views of some critics
who argue that the Code would disadvantage the United States by
impeding advances in space technology because those advances
are also likely to be labeled as “military” in nature and inconsistent
with the goal of preventing an “arms race” in space.177
Successful military operations in outer space remain highly dependent on advanced technology. For this reason, U.S. space policies have long emphasized that “to achieve national security objectives and compete successfully internationally, the U.S. must
maintain technological leadership in space.”178 Recent U.S. space
policy statements reaffirm that the United States must continue to
“pursue, adapt, and evolve the unique technologies, innovative
exploitation techniques, and diverse applications that give the
United States its strategic advantage in space.”179
Since a state’s judgment of its military strength and security is
inherently relativistic, international competition in national security matters is more like a race than an effort to achieve any specific
Letter from Rep. Michael Turner, Chairman, Subcomm. on Strategic Forces, H. Armed Services Comm. et al., to President Barack Obama (Jan. 18, 2012) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Letter from Rep. Michael Turner et al.] (“[N]o one
can know today what programs the United States may need to undertake in outer
space in the future for its military and intelligence national security requirements”).
176 Id.
177
See, e.g., John R. Bolton & John C. Yoo, Opinion, Hands Off the Heavens,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/09/opinion/handsoff-the-heavens.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/B49D-ZCYK]; see also CODE, supra
note 32, Preamble, ¶6 (noting “the importance of preventing an arms race in outer
space”).
178
COMM’N TO ASSESS U.S. NAT’L SEC. SPACE MGMT. AND ORG. REP. (Jan. 11,
2011), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/spaceintro.pdf [https://perma.cc/
A9BJ-4AWS].
179 National Security Space Strategy, supra note 12, at 7.
175
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standard or goal.180 Important technological innovations fundamentally change the nature of this race as they may allow a state
“to get a competitive jump on its rivals.”181 Technological innovations with military implications by one state may thus inspire great
insecurity in other states, particularly as they relate to activities in
outer space.182
For a liberal democracy involved in national security-related
“competition” in space, efforts to achieve and maintain technological superiority may present special challenges. Broad R&D initiatives related to new space technologies with military applications
are likely to be scrutinized by legislatures, the media and domestic
interest groups and may raise suspicions that new offensive space
capabilities are under development. Currently, such suspicions are
not invoked in support of campaigns or significant protests against
the U.S. government for violating any international commitments
in space. If, however, the United States subscribes to the Code, this
scrutiny would have a new focus.
The continuing revision of official drafts of the Code indicates
that new U.S. space military capabilities, even if they are described
as being “defensive” in nature, are likely to be heavily scrutinized
and criticized if the United States adopts the Code. For example,
although an earlier 2010 draft of the Code explicitly provided that
“a comprehensive approach to safety and security in outer space
should be guided by . . . due consideration for the legitimate defence interests of States,” that clause was omitted in the 2013 revised draft because it “was seen as particularly troublesome by
many states given that it could be interpreted subjectively, favoring certain states to potentially weaponize their space capabilities.”183
Even the basic reference to the inherent right of states to individual and collective self-defense in the current draft of the Code is
problematic for some states since they view such a provision as a
180 STEIN, supra note 96, at 115, 126 (further noting that a nation’s situation in
this area is ultimately “addressed in relative terms, in an assessment of relative
numbers, relative capabilities, and potential consequences”).
181 Id. at 115.
182 Id. (noting how the Soviets’ ability to launch Sputnik in 1957 illuminated
numerous dangers, “symbolized an apparent American failure to keep up with
the Russians scientifically,” and that in turn “suggested that the United States
would fall behind militarily”).
183 Pillai Rajagopalan, EU’s New Space Code: A Significant Improvement, SPACE
NEWS, Nov. 11, 2013, http://spacenews.com/38115eus-new-space-code-asignificant-improvement/ [https://perma.cc/Z3JJ-XQHD].
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“back door” to “legitimising weaponisation of outer space.”184
While a clause explicitly ensuring the fundamental right of selfdefense is an essential requirement for the United States in any
code of conduct for space activities, countries that view U.S. space
programs with suspicion continue to fear that such a provision
“opens the possibilities to increase the use of force, weapons and
the militarisation of the outer space arena.”185
The fears that states clearly harbor regarding the militarization
and weaponization of space (and related suspicions regarding U.S.
space programs) seem likely to generate controversy over the interpretation by the United States of key terms in any future version
of the Code to which the United States subscribes. Similar interpretations and related new military space programs and research
activities may be pursued without difficulty in authoritarian states,
but would be subject to great scrutiny by private interest groups,
the media and the Congress in the United States.
The potential public scrutiny of U.S. compliance with Code
provisions has led some conservative critics in the United States to
argue that, even though it is a non-binding instrument, the Code
could effectively impede a variety of U.S. military space programs
and a host of technology improvements that may have military or
intelligence applications to space.186 While some of these fears may
be overstated, they nonetheless represent concerns that are present
only in a liberal democracy or a state in which military programs
and financing are relatively transparent, and where military agencies and defense industries are monitored by independent legislatures, media, and civil society groups.
Elatawy, supra note 84, at 45, 49.
Roberto Becerra & Romina Acevedo, ICoC: Perspectives from Latin America
and the Caribbean, in AWAITING LAUNCH, supra note 33, at 169, 173 (noting further
that “[d]eveloping countries, particularly those in Latin America and the Caribbean, have expressed that consensus will be difficult to reach if the text of ICoC refers to the concept of right to self-defence.”); Micah Zenko, A Code of Conduct for
Outer
Space,
Council
on
Foreign
Relations
(2011),
available
at
http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Policy_Innovation_Memo10_
Zenko.pdf [https://perma.cc/F67J-UCKV] (“Officials from Brazil and many other
South American countries have said that the explicit reference to Article 51 undermines several important aspects of the code. They fear that Article 4.2 of the
code will be used to justify weaponizing space and create an arms race in space
under the veiled claims of defense”).
186 Bolton & Yoo, supra note 177, (“Taken literally, the European Union code
would interfere with our ability to develop antiballistic missile systems in space,
test antisatellite weapons and gather intelligence.”); see also Letter from ThirtySeven Senators to Hillary Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, supra note 83.
184
185
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4. THE CODE AS A PROBLEMATIC SOFT LAW VARIANT

4.1. The Problem of “Soft Law on Soft Law”
Since the subject matter of the proposed Code clearly involves
issues of common concern to all states, it might appear at first
glance to be a document that could be easily embraced by the international community. States have not, however, acted with any
sense of urgency in approving the proposed Code, which has been
under consideration since 2008. This lack of enthusiasm may be
attributed in part to the fact that the proposed Code is not the first
soft law instrument to address the subject matter at issue. In fact,
efforts to promote the Code raise serious questions about the effectiveness of duplicative soft law approaches to key problems in
space and about the wisdom of imposing one type of soft law
framework on top of another, different, existing type of soft law.
This is particularly true as it relates to addressing the most pressing issue now confronting the international community in space:
the problem of orbital space debris.
The proposed Code represents a particular type of soft law, one
that is developed at a high level by the diplomats of states and international organizations. While such “top-down diplomatic approaches” can make significant contributions to collaborative activities in space, another approach to soft law focuses on the technical
work of specialized governmental agencies and on “bottom-up
best practices developed and demonstrated by commercial operators, academic institutions, and other technical experts.”187
Bottom-up, non-binding best practices and similar initiatives
are typified by approaching space topics “from an applied technical perspective focusing on solving problems facing those working and operating in the space field.”188 In contrast to what is
sometimes referred to as the “top-down diplomatic approach,” this
bottom-up approach allows specific technical issues to be adSchulte & Schaffer, supra note 44, at 9.
Ben Baseley-Walker, Current International Space Security Initiatives, in THE
FAIR AND RESPONSIBLE USE OF SPACE: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 109 (Wolfgang Rathgeber, Kai-Uwe Schrogl & Ray A. Williamson eds., 2010); see also
Schulte & Schaffer, supra note 44, at 14 (noting that bottom-up best practice guidelines “develop over time and grow out of successful experience and operator requirements”).
187
188
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dressed in detail by individuals drawn from the community of
technical experts who are “best qualified to address the specifics”
and who represent industry, non-governmental organizations, and
the specialized governmental agencies of the interested parties.189
The most successful and widely recognized example of the bottom-up, non-binding, best practices approach in space is the collaborative development of international space debris mitigation
guidelines by the Inter-Agency Debris Coordination Committee
(“IADC”).190 The IADC consists of the representatives of the European Space Agency and the space agencies of the twelve most active space nations who exchange information on space debris research activities, cooperate on space debris research, and identify
debris mitigation options.191 Drawing on NASA’s 1995 Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices (the world’s first such guidelines), the IADC developed a set of technical guidelines for minimizing the creation of space debris, the IADC Debris Mitigation
Guidelines (the “IADC Guidelines”), and submitted them to the
U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (“UN
COPUOS”) in 2002.192 The IADC Guidelines served as the basis for
189 Kueter, supra note 116, at 3 (describing the bottom-up approach as one in
which “specific issues are addressed in detail by government and nongovernment technical experts drawn from interested parties . . . ”). This approach
is presented in contrast to discussion and activity stimulated by the “top-down
imprimatur provided by high-ranking diplomatic officials.” See also Kueter, supra
note 172, at 4.
190 Kueter, supra note 172, at 5 (noting that “[d]ebris mitigation offers the best
example of a bottom-up effort to address a space management issue.”); BaseleyWalker, supra note 188, at 115 (“The IADC’s development of the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines over the course of more than a decade was a success.”); Jana
Robinson, Advancing an International Space Code of Conduct, EU Non-Proliferation
Consortium, July 13 2012, http://www.nonproliferation.eu/thematics/
index.php?codename=space [https://perma.cc/HSM7-5K7K] (noting that the
“practical approach” of the Inter-Agency Debris Mitigation Guidelines “represents an example of a successful bottom-up approach that has significantly contributed to preserving the outer space environment”).
191 Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee, http://www.iadconline.org/ [https://perma.cc/R8M7-UKDH]. In addition to NASA, the eleven
other members of the IADC currently include the space agencies of: Canada, China, France, Germany, Japan, India, Italy, Korea, Russia, the United Kingdom, and
Ukraine. Id.
192 Schulte & Schaffer, supra note 44, at 14–15; NASA, WINGS IN ORBIT:
SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING LEGACIES OF THE SPACE SHUTTLES 445 (2010), available at
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20110011792.pdf
[https://perma.cc/32GW-UMMS]. The latest version of the guidelines was
adopted in 2007. Inter-Agency Debris Mitigation Guidelines, Sept. 2007, IADC-02-01,
available at http://iadc-online.org/Documents/IADC-2002-01,%20IADC%20Space
%20Debris%20Guidelines,%20Revision%201.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8WEQ-
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the UN COPUOS Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines (“UN
COPUOS Guidelines”), which were adopted in 2007 and later endorsed by the U.N. General Assembly.193
Although the IADC and subsequent UN COPUOS Guidelines
are non-binding, they have had an important and legally significant impact on the national regulatory frameworks of many countries.194 In the United States, these debris mitigation practices have
been implemented for government-sponsored space missions
through directives and instructions of NASA and DoD and for
commercial space operations through the regulations and procedures of the Federal Communications Commission, and the Departments of Commerce and Transportation.195 The cumulative effect of numerous countries and their national agencies
implementing such regulations is an increasingly more harmonized approach in national legal frameworks regarding the critical
issue of space debris generation. Although these practical, bottomup, technical-based debris mitigation standards originated in a soft
law instrument, there is nonetheless a reasonable chance that they
will evolve into “a generally accepted state of art which no actual
or potential actor in space can afford to ignore.”196
While each country’s debris mitigation standards and regulations vary, their fundamental principles and objectives—as established in the IADC Guidelines—are the same: “(1) Preventing on2QF6]; see also Lotta Viikari, Environmental Aspects of Space Activities, in HANDBOOK
OF SPACE LAW 717, 742 (Frans von der Dunk ed., 2015).
193 Viikari, supra note 192, at 742; REP. OF THE COMM. ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF
OUTER SPACE, U.N. Doc. A/62/20, ¶127, Supp. No. 20 (2007), available at
http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gadocs/A_62_20E.pdf
[https://perma.cc/76S4DJKH]; International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Space, U.N. G.A. Res.
62/217 (2008), available at http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gares/ARES_62_
217E.pdf [https://perma.cc/8R3J-ZZMW].
194 Viikari, supra note 192, at 743 (“The Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of
UN COPUOS are 'the leading international arrangement to mitigate space debris.’”).
195
Nicholas Johnson, Orbital Debris: The Growing Threat to Space Operations,
http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/20100004498.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Q65A-EP5W]. Johnson is the Chief Scientist and Program Manager for
NASA’s Orbital Debris Program Office.
196
I. Marboe & F. Hafner, Brief Overview over National Authorization Mechanisms in Implementation of the UN International Space Treaties, in NATIONAL SPACE
LEGISLATION IN EUROPE: ISSUES OF AUTHORISATION OF PRIVATE SPACE ACTIVITIES IN
THE LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPEAN SPACE COOPERATION 29, 70–71 (Frans G.
von der Dunk, ed., 2011).
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orbit break-ups; (2) Removing spacecraft and orbital stages that
have reached the end of their mission operations from the useful
densely populated orbit regions, and (3) limiting the objects released during normal operations.”197 These objectives are achieved
through requirements and standards, which address: objects released intentionally and unintentionally during mission operations; fragments caused by on-obit breakups (including on-orbit
collisions, accidental break-ups, and intentional destruction of objects); and break-ups after mission termination.198
The IADC Guidelines, and the UN COPUOS Guidelines that
they inspired, have made a widely recognized, significant contribution to preserving the outer space environment and numerous
states have codified debris mitigation standards into their national
regulatory frameworks.199 Citing the success of collaborative,
technical, bottom-up debris mitigation efforts, critics of the proposed Code suggest that a top-down, diplomatically-driven multilateral code is “not needed to spur international dialogue on issues
important to space operations.”200 In addition, unlike the defined
technical objectives and agreed processes that have served as a solid foundation for IADC efforts, critics note that states subscribing
to the Code are guided only by statements of principles with no accompanying indication of how those principles are to be recognized or practically implemented.201
A diplomatically driven, top-down form of soft law being im197
Inter-Agency Space Debris Mitigation Committee, Support to the IADC
Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, IADC-04-06, Rev 5.5 (May 2014),
http://www.iadc-online.org/Documents/IADC-04-06%20Support%20to%
20IADC%20Guidelines%20rev5.5.pdf [https://perma.cc/R8M7-UKDH].
The
Guidelines comprehensively apply to operations from the launch phase, through
mission phase, to the end-of-mission disposal phase (in which spacecraft or orbital
stages are maneuvered into positions or situations so as to not to cause interference with active spacecraft or orbital stages). Id.
198 Id.
199
See Compendium, Space Debris Mitigation Standards Adopted by States and
International Organizations, U.N. OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFF. (6 June 2014), available
at
http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/limited/l/AC105_2014_CRP13E.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TC74-ZVF9]
200 See, e.g., Kueter, supra note 172, at 5 (further posing the question that if the
IADC Guidelines and similar efforts “are judged insufficient by Code proponents,
what additional steps do they favor?”).
201
Id. at 3–4 (arguing that without defined objectives, processes or a technical framework to rely on, states subscribing to the Code essentially “buy into a
process whose outcomes remain undefined”).
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posed on a technical, bottom-up version also raises the prospect of
confusion and potential conflict between different frameworks attempting to regulate the same subject matter. With multiple
frameworks seeking to establish the same type of operational space
guidelines, some experts question whether any clarity that has or
can be achieved in this area “will soon become over-complicated
by a plethora of ‘how-to’ efforts . . . .”202
Differences in the nature of the entities responsible for topdown and bottom-up initiatives in space may further complicate
the practical application of technical rules and standards in space.
In contrast to technical guidelines developed first at the working
level, top-down, diplomatically driven initiatives are generally
sponsored by international organizations (such as various U.N. institutions) with high-level officials representing many states and
operating by consensus—thus giving rise to fears voiced by some
experts that there is a “substantial risk that politics may overtake
practical substance” in this area.203
Conflicting interpretations of different guidelines that are applied to the same subject matter in space, yet are generated by contrasting soft law approaches, may have highly negative consequences. If the statements of principles in the proposed Code are
nothing more than a reaffirmation of existing principles and an endorsement of the standards already developed by the IADC, it is
hard to see much value in the great effort expended to date on their
adoption. If, on the other hand, the proposed Code is intended to
create new norms (as its proponents suggest), there is a risk of disputes arising from conflicting interpretations of these different soft
law frameworks, resulting in an even less stable security environ202 See, e.g., Baseley-Walker, supra note 188, at 115 (noting also that it is a matter of “some concern” how various sets of best practices established by different
groups, including the IADC and a COPUOS Working Group of Experts, relate to
other initiatives currently being discussed, particularly the ICoC.). Such concerns
are reflected in a new clause in the latest draft of the Code, which attempts to affirm that subscribing states are acting “without prejudice to ongoing and future
work in other appropriate international fora relevant to the peaceful exploration
and use of outer space . . . .” CODE, supra note 32, Preamble, ¶15. Yet, it is unclear
how such language will prevent conflicting approaches and interpretations of the
Code and other instruments from arising or in what manner it will clearly define
how the work of different groups will relate to each other. Id.
203 Id. at 115–116 (observing that while the IADC submits its proposals to the
UN for approval and is thus “dual track, with one foot inside the UN and one
outside,” some other groups, such as the COPUOS Working Group of Experts, are
more engaged in the UN system from the outset, thus elevating the risk of politics
overtaking practical substance.).
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ment in space.204
If any soft law mechanism is to be employed in improving the
security of space objects (particularly to address the problem of orbital debris), there is a strong argument to be made for bottom-up,
technically-based guidelines as a means of developing at least
some types of significant rules-based behavior.205 Such technical
guidelines enhancing the security of space operations are historically not the results of top-down diplomatic efforts, but instead are
drawn from the “existing operational experience of the principal
actors, commercial operators and government agencies.”206 It is
this community of actors, and not the “space diplomatic corps in
Vienna,” that some commentators argue is the “proper source for
the emergence of a normative, behavior-oriented regime.”207
Two other major goals of the proposed Code—improving space
safety and space traffic management (“STM”)—are fundamentally
linked to the problem of space debris and appear to also be best
addressed, and to some extent are already being addressed, by bottom-up, technical collaboration instead of top-down, diplomatic
initiatives.208 International air traffic controls may perhaps be cited
as a precedent or analogy for this approach, since those controls
emerged only after many years of working-level efforts involving
private airlines and various governmental agencies responsible for
aviation matters.209
Kueter, supra note 172, at 4 (“The ICoC is just a shell . . . conflicting interpretations will lead to confusion when disputes inevitably arise and could result
in an even less transparent and less stable security environment in space”).
205
Gerard Brachet, Peace in Space: Building on the Outer Space Treaty, in
CELEBRATING THE SPACE AGE: 50 YEARS OF SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 40 YEARS OF THE
OUTER SPACE TREATY. CONFERENCE REPORT 2–3 APR. 2007, 67, 69–70 (United Nations 2007), available at http://unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/celebratingthe-space-age-50-years-of-space-technology-40-years-of-the-outer-space-treatyconference-report-2-3-april-2007-331.pdf [https://perma.cc/YFK8-X327] [hereinafter CELEBRATING THE SPACE AGE] (“[T]here is within COPUOS a shared feeling
that bottom-up, technically-based guidelines and recommendations are powerful
means to develop rules-based behaviour and keep outer space as safe as possible”).
206 Id.
207 E.g., Kueter, supra note 116, at 3.
208 STM and space safety are subjects are subjects dominated by the problem
of space debris. See
Marshall H. Kaplan, An Integrated Approach to Orbital Debris Research and Management, SPACE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE 6 (Nov. 6, 2014), available at
http://commons.erau.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=stm
[https://perma.cc/GY97-2GYC] (“It appears reasonable to assume that a first step
in developing a space traffic management system is to address the issue of manag204
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With respect to initial, inter-agency efforts to address space
traffic management issues, the U.S. Strategic Command has in recent years entered into “Space Situational Awareness” (“SSA”)
sharing agreements with forty-one commercial firms and five nations in order to develop routine operational space partnerships
and improved international data sharing.210 These SSA Agreements are described as laying the foundation for increased international cooperation, and are further aided by efforts to integrate
partner nation sensors into the U.S. Space Surveillance Network.211
Expanded operational working relationships in this area continue
to be encouraged by the U.S. Government, particularly by the U.S.
Defense Department, in order to “improve the quantity and quality
of the SSA information it obtains and expand provision of safety of
flight services to U.S. Government agencies, other nations, and
commercial firms.”212
There are also private efforts involving operational data exchanges aimed at ensuring the “safety and integrity of satellite operations” through “controlled, reliable and efficient sharing of data.”213 The Space Data Association, a private limited liability nonprofit, has developed the Space Data Center (“SDC”), which is deing the large number of passive derelict objects that could eventually jam the traffic lanes”).
209 Jeff Kueter, supra note 189, at 4 (noting how “[T]he emergence of the air
traffic control regime supports the ‘bottom-up’ approach”).
210 Space Traffic Management: How to Prevent a Real Life “Gravity”: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Space of the H. Comm. on Sci., Space, and Tech., 105th Cong. 1
(statement of Lt. Gen. John “Jay” Raymond), available at http://
democrats.science.house.gov/sites/democrats.science.house.gov/files/
documents/Raymond%20JFCC%20HSST%20Statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8PUR-96ZY]
(noting
that
in
2014
“seven
additional
commercial/intergovernmental and five more national agreements are in work”).
211 Id. (noting further that the first such sensor—the Canadian Sapphire satellite—was recently incorporated and that work is underway to place a US Space
surveillance telescope and radar in Australia.).
212
National Security Space Strategy, supra note 12, at 6 (further stating that
“[s]hared awareness of spaceflight activity must improve in order to foster global
spaceflight safety and help prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust. DoD
will . . . seek to establish agreements with other nations and commercial firms to
maintain and improve space object databases, pursue common international data
standards and data integrity measures, and provide services and disseminate orbital tracking information, including predictions of space object conjunction, to
enhance spaceflight safety for all parties”).
213
SDA Overview, SPACE DATA ASSOC., http://www.space-data.org/sda/
wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/03/20120312_SDA_Users_Mtg_4_
General_Session.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9NS-7VTD] (last accessed Aug. 25,
2015).
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scribed as a “secure, reliable completely automated analytical information system,” in order to address “conjunction analysis and
[radio-frequency interference.]”214 The SDC has been programmed
so as to allow members of the Space Data Association to share “real-time critical operational data essential to the better protection of
their respective satellite fleets and management of the overall earth
orbit environment.”215 This private initiative at reducing satellite
collisions is recognized as “the way forward” alongside the IADC
Debris Mitigation Guidelines.216
Unlike fledgling public and private efforts to advance STM and
space safety issues, debris mitigation measures have achieved a
significant level of development and sophistication over many
years under the auspices of the IADC. While the impact of the
IADC Guidelines is significant, major issues related to orbital space
debris remain to be addressed by the international community, including remediation problems and certain critical activities (notably the intentional destruction of objects in space as part of hit-tokill ASAT weapons testing) that produce unusually large and dangerous amounts of debris.217 Because these problems are linked to
important and sensitive arms control and security issues in space,
they lie beyond the competence of a set of voluntary, technical best
practices or the competence of any other soft law instrument.218
The intentional destruction of a space object by China (in its debrisgenerating ASAT test in January, 2007) clearly demonstrates this
point, since the non-binding IADC Guidelines then in effect (which
China had subscribed to) called upon states to avoid the “inten214 Richard DalBellow & Michael Mendelson, Private Risk Management in Orbital Operations: Inter-operator Liability and the Space Data Association 8, available at
www.intelsatgeneral.com/wpcontent/uploads/files/DalBello%20Mendelson%20Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H6C8-VU5Z] (last accessed Sept. 2, 2015).
215 Id. at 8–9.
216 Joseph N. Pelton, SPACE DEBRIS AND OTHER THREATS FROM OUTER SPACE 34
(2013).
217
See David Wright, Orbital Debris Produced by Kinetic-Energy Anti-Satellite
Weapons, in CELEBRATING THE SPACE AGE, supra note 205, at 155 (noting that
“[s]pace debris can pose a long-term threat to the future use of outer space. One
of the biggest sources of such debris would be the intentional destruction of satellites by anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons . . . since there is currently no effective way
to remove large amounts of debris from orbit, controlling its production is essential for preserving the long-term use of space”).
218 See Viikari, supra note 192, at 744 (noting how the IADC Guidelines, and
the COPUOS Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines that they inspired, fail to address the problem of ASAT testing).
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tional destruction of a space system (self-destruction, intentional
collision, etc.) and other harmful activities that may significantly
increase collision risks to other systems . . . .”219
It is thus not surprising that although the IADC Guidelines
(and the national laws and regulations implementing those guidelines) have contributed to improving the regulation of space debris,
some commentators suggest that non-binding mechanisms like the
Guidelines might not represent “the optimal solution in the long
run,” especially if the goal is to effectively regulate all actors in
space.220 Instead, they correctly argue that the time has come for
states to instead agree on legally binding measures for regulating
the prevention and management of space debris.221
To the extent that soft law can play a valuable role in mitigating space debris, it appears to be best employed in bottom-up initiatives based on the successful model of the IADC Guidelines. A
new type of soft law placed on top of these existing efforts cannot
accomplish what a new legally binding agreement can achieve,
particularly in the context of volatile space arms control and security issues. On the contrary, such a top-down, diplomatically-driven
soft law approach risks causing confusion, conflict and greater insecurity in space while at the same time diminishing the existing
legal and administrative framework governing activities in space.
4.2. The Problem of “Fractional Soft Law”
Even though the first draft of the proposed Code was introduced over seven years ago, widespread acceptance of the document by states has been understandably difficult to achieve; as of
the most recent meeting of 109 states discussing the adoption of the
Code (in September 2015), there is still no timetable for its finaliza-

219
Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee Space Debris Mitigation
Guidelines, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space Scientific and Technical Subcommittee, A/AC.105/C.1/L.260, Nov. 29, 2002, § 5.2.3 available at
http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/publications/st_space_49E.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PB63-8EA6].
220
FABIO TRONCHETTI, FUNDAMENTAL OF SPACE LAW AND POLICY 82 (2013)
(suggesting that such new, legally binding measures should apply “during all
phases of space activity”, and noting that “no international binding rules regulating the prevention, disposal and removal of space debris exist”).
221 Id.
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tion.222 The proposed Code continues to enjoy support from only a
fraction of the international community. Although some significant space-faring countries, including members of the European
Union, Japan, Canada, and Australia, have expressed varying degrees of support for the proposed Code, opposition continues to be
expected from other major space powers, particularly Russia and
China.223
Opposition to the proposed Code from the Russian and Chinese governments appears to be motivated primarily by the continuing concern of these major space powers that efforts to promote the Code could undermine the adoption of their preferred,
jointly proposed and legally binding PPWT agreement.224 While
the PPWT requires states “not to place any weapons in outer
space,” it controversially excludes any restrictions on terrestriallybased ASAT weapons (which the United States describes as “the
most pressing, existing threat to outer space systems”).225 For this
and other reasons, including the lack of any verification regime,
the United States has rejected the PPWT for failing to meet its
standards for consideration of space arms control proposals, namely that they “must be equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance
the national security of the United States and its allies.”226 To this
point in time, however, the benefits and relative advantages that
Russia and China perceive in continuing to promote the legally
binding PPWT (which the United States does not hesitate to describe as an inequitable and flawed agreement) appear to outweigh
222
Timothy Farnsworth, No End in Sight for Space Code, ARMS CONTROL
TODAY, 1 (2015), http://www.armscontrol.org/print/7174 [https://perma.cc/
NE5Y-DDWY] (“After eight years of drafting and negotiating the text of a code of
conduct for activities in outer space, officials from several key countries indicated
last month that they have no timetable for finalizing the agreement and opening it
for signature”).
223 Lele, supra note 79, at 15.
224
Id. at 15–16; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, supra
note 71, at 118 (expressing concern that the drafting of the ICoC “must not undermine our efforts aimed at elaborating the PPWT.”); Xavier Pasco, ICoC: An Imperfect but Necessary Step?, in AWAITING LAUNCH, supra note 33, at 95, 98 (noting
that Chinese and Russian representatives “have constantly defended the merits of
PPWT” by “sometimes directly challenging the EU-supported approach”).
225 Draft PPWT, June 12, 2014, supra note 85, Art. II; Note Verbale Dated 2 September 2014 from the Delegation of the United States of America to the Conference On
Disarmament Addressed to the Acting Secretary-General of the Conference Transmitting
the United States of America Analysis of the 2014 Russian-Chinese Draft PPWT [hereinafter Note Verbale].
226 Note Verbale, supra note 226.
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any interest in subscribing to the Code.
The Russian and Chinese governments are currently joined by
other states (e.g., Brazil, India, and South Africa) in expressing a
preference for some form of legally binding agreement over the
Code.227 Numerous states, including significant space stakeholders
such as India and Brazil, have also frequently expressed serious
concerns about the Euro-centric process adopted by the European
Union to advance the Code.228 Indeed, the failure of the European
Union to include non-EU states (other than the United States) in
the early stages of developing the Code has been strongly criticized
and continues to cast doubts on prospects for the instrument’s
wider acceptance.229 (This concern recently led many states to request that future discussions of Code be moved to a truly multilateral forum, preferably the U.N. General Assembly.230) Several
emerging space powers have also expressed concern about signing
the proposed Code because of “possible constraints applied to nascent space programmes,” a concern which forms part of a larger
criticism that international opinion on activities in space is too
much a by-product of the strategies of the main space powers.231
Paul Meyer, Star-Crossed: An International Code of Conduct for Outer Space?,
CANADA INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL, Aug. 31, 2015, http://opencanada.org/
features/star-crossed-an-international-code-of-conduct-for-outer-space/ [https://
perma.cc/7X5A-WCJ5].
228 Jana Robinson, Europe’s Space Diplomacy Initiative: The International Code of
Conduct, in DECODING THE CODE (2012), supra note 30, at 27, 28.
229 Victoria Samson, ICOC: NEED OF THE HOUR, IN DECODING THE CODE, supra
note 30, at 136–137 (“[T]he fact of the matter is that other major space-faring nations should have been brought into the process earlier than they were.”); Peter
Garretson, WHAT'S IN A CODE?: PUTTING SPACE DEVELOPMENT FIRST, IN AWAITING
LAUNCH, supra note 33, at 27, 28 (noting that space-capable Asian states are unlikely to feel that they have materially shaped the Code to reflect their interests because they have a problem with “the manner in which it [the Code] came to
them”).
230
Chair’s Summary, Multilateral Negotiations on an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, New York, 27–31 July 2015, ¶ 17, https://
papersmart.unmeetings.org/media2/7650931/chairs-summary-corrected-1-.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C8E6-VSZH] (“It was the assessment of the Chair that the
most supported way forward would be the pursuit of negotiations within the
framework of the United Nations through a mandate of the General Assembly”).
231
Xavier Pasco, ICOC: AN IMPERFECT BUT NECESSARY STEP?, IN AWAITING
LAUNCH, supra note 33, at 95, 98; see also Akshan de Alwis, New Tensions on How to
Regulate Outer Space, DIPLOMATIC COURIER, Aug. 10, 2015, http://
www.diplomaticourier.com/new-tensions-on-how-to-regulate-outer-space/
[https://perma.cc/MJH9-ATVJ] (noting that many developing nations “expressed a suspicion that the ICoC could be used to bottleneck their expansion into
space” and that “[m]any nations in Africa and Latin America are yet to fully de227
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Although the United States had originally expressed tentative
support for the proposed code, on January 17, 2012, the U.S. State
Department issued a statement announcing that “[t]he European
Union’s draft Code of Conduct is a good foundation for the development of a non-legally binding International Code of Conduct.”232
While emphasizing that the United States would join with the European Union and other states to develop a code of conduct for
outer space activities, Secretary of State Clinton declared that “we
will not enter into a code of conduct that in any way constrains our
national security-related activities in space or our ability to protect
the United States and our allies.”233 To this point, however, the
United States has not offered any proposed alternative to the
Code.234
Notwithstanding the U.S. government’s reluctance to sign the
current draft of the proposed Code, senior U.S. officials argue that
a code of conduct for space could enhance US national security by
“serving as one of the most visible and political ways in which nations commit to acting responsibly in space” and that “[n]ations
willfully acting contrary to a code could expect to be isolated as
rogue actors.”235 Yet these same officials also concede that it is only
by “establishing widely accepted guidelines for responsible behavior
in space” that the national security of the United States and its allies will be enhanced.236
A similar official position found in a U.S. Department of Defense press release notes that “[a] widely-subscribed Code can envelop their space capabilities, so some perceive any regulatory instrument by the
West as an effort to limit their future capabilities”).
232
An International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities: Strengthening
Long-Term Sustainability, Stability, Safety, and Security in Space, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE,
Jan. 17, 2012, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/181208.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7TDT-ZFST] (emphasis added).
233 Press Statement, Sec’y of State Clinton, supra note 18.
234
Senior U.S. officials instead continue to express conceptual support for
the Code and similar proposals. For example, in August 2015 at a multilateral
conference at the U.N., the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance said “[w]e must look closely at the proposed Code and
appreciate the effort that the European Union and others in the international
community have put into crafting a document that provide us with an opportunity to reach agreement in the near term on a series of voluntary, non-legally binding, pragmatic, and timely measures that are essential to the long-term sustainability, safety, stability, and security of the outer space environment.” de Alwis,
supra note 231.
235 Schulte, supra note 44, at 14.
236 Id. at 11, 14 (emphasis added).
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courage responsible space behavior and single out those who act
otherwise, while reducing risk of misunderstanding and misconduct.”237 Another DoD fact sheet notes that it is a “broadly-accepted
set of international norms of responsible behavior” that can be expected to have “a positive effect on deterrence” and “help the international community identify and isolate aggressors.”238
Thus, according to U.S. Department of Defense policy, only a
“widely-subscribed” and “broadly-accepted” code (that presumably includes major space-faring powers like Russia and China)
could hope to identify and isolate states that act contrary to its
rules (notwithstanding the need for such rules to also be part of a
clear, legally binding and credible commitment by the states involved, as discussed above). Although the Russian and Chinese
governments could view the non-binding Code as providing some
relative compliance advantages over the United States (as discussed in Part 3.4., supra), they are unlikely to subscribe to the
Code if doing so in any way interferes with their continuing efforts
to promote their higher priority—and to them, more advantageous—legally binding PPWT agreement.239
Russia and China thus continue to lie beyond the reach of the
Code, defeating efforts by proponents to make the Code a widely
subscribed and broadly accepted instrument and greatly diminishing its purported “norm-setting” capabilities. Whatever benefits
soft law instruments are asserted to have in addressing security
matters, participation by only a fraction of states in the Code, particularly a fraction that fails to include all the major space-faring
countries, will not provide a sound basis for establishing new
norms or help to identify or isolate aggressors and other nonparticipating, misbehaving states. Furthermore, states facing perceived security threats in space are not likely to be assured by a
fractional version of the Code in which their potential adversaries
do not even participate.
In some areas of international cooperation, such as the protection of human rights, persuading only a fraction of states to initially sign multilateral instruments may be viewed as a positive, proFact Sheet: International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, U.S. DEPT.
DEFENSE, (emphasis added) http://archive.defense.gov/home/features/
2011/0111_nsss/docs/FINAL_DoD_Fact_Sheet_International_Code-2012_1-1712.pdf [https://perma.cc/PEU3-UE5J].
238 Id.
239 See Draft Treaty supra note 85, and Lele supra note 79 and accompanying
text.
237
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gressive step of achievement (particularly since human rights
agreements are not focused on reciprocal obligations).240 As an
arms control initiative for space, however, the Code’s failure to include Russia and China and other major space stakeholders is a
fundamental flaw. The absence of powerful, potential adversaries
makes multilateral conventions addressing arms control or disarmament issues highly problematic for those states contemplating
joining such regimes and making potentially dangerous, nonreciprocal commitments.241 To the extent that soft law arrangements such as the proposed Code seek to promote arms control
measures in the face of severe security dilemmas and the threat of
arms races, the non-participation of powerful adversaries clearly
undermines such efforts.
If the proposed Code is adopted by states in its current state of
limited acceptance, a fractional soft law product will emerge which
will present its own particular disadvantages and problems (beyond those associated with soft law arrangements generally). Not
only would a fractionalized Code fail to identify aggressors and
isolate rogue states, it could instead lead to de facto competing legal
regimes in space, as subscribing states respect their own “rules of
the road” while other non-participating states—especially major,
non-participating space powers—seek to advance their own interests through different or less restrictive approaches. Attempts to
later successfully persuade non-participating states to accede to the
Code will be challenging, if not impossible, and could risk further
weakening rather than improving the Code.242
Still another casualty of a fractionalized Code would be any attempt to establish new and meaningful transparency and confidence building measures through the sharing of information. InDinah Shelton, LAW, NON-LAW AND THE PROBLEM OF ‘SOFT LAW’, IN
COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE, supra note 134, at 1, 3 (“Human rights law has developed over the past fifty years into a broad code of behavior for states and state
agents, not only in their relations with other states, but primarily as nonreciprocal, unilateral commitments towards all those within the jurisdiction of the
state”).
241 Richard L. Williamson Jr., Hard Law, Soft Law, and Non-Law in Multilateral
Arms Control: Some Compliance Hypotheses, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L 59, 61–62 (2003) (“Other
matters can affect a treaty’s effectiveness, such as the degree to which essential
nations become parties to the treaty. If key parties remain outside the treaty, it
increases pressure on the other states to withdraw or cheat”).
242
See Kueter, supra note 172, at 7–8 (noting that if non-participating states
are dissatisfied with the ICoC, they “can be expected to demand concessions, both
formal and informal . . . to secure their signature on the Code”).
240
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formation serves a central function in the Code since subscribing
states resolve to share information on a wide variety of topics, notably regarding “their space strategies and policies, including those
which are security-related, in all aspects which could affect the
safety, security, and sustainability of current and planned activities
in outer space” as well as “their major outer space research and
space applications programmes.”243
Space law generally seeks to maintain a focus on the free and
open sharing of information for the benefit and safety of all nations.244 The Code, however, contains restrictive informationsharing provisions requiring subscribing states to share information only with other subscribing states.245 This restrictive information sharing arrangement, which was not part of the first draft
of the Code in 2008, appears to reflect the insecurity of would-be
subscribing states as they now contemplate the likelihood of fractional state participation in the Code and the possibility of sharing
potentially sensitive information with numerous non-subscribing
states on a non-reciprocal basis. This restrictive information arrangement defeats the larger purposes of the Code (“enhancing the
safety, security, and sustainability of outer space activities”)246
since even information relating to potentially dangerous activities
which threaten all space-faring states are not required under the
Code to be distributed to the international community as a whole.
The absence of key state actors in the information sharing process significantly undermines the ability of the Code to bring genuine transparency to space activities. Furthermore, the voluntary
nature of the process does nothing to ensure the accuracy or completeness of the information that is submitted, especially since subscribing states are unlikely to voluntarily submit many types of
sensitive space data related to important scientific and technological capabilities.247 The obvious failings of this mechanism have
Code, supra note 32, § 6.1.
See Space Law, U.N. OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS,
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/informationfor/faqs.html [https://perma.cc/
FW63-C2BB] (noting that in order to achieve its primary goals, space law addresses a variety of diverse matters, including “sharing of information about potential
dangers in outer space”).
245 Code, supra note 32, § 6.1 (“The Subscribing States resolve to share, on an
annual basis, where available and appropriate, information with the other Subscribing States”).
246 Id. at Preamble, ¶10.
247
Lele, supra note 79, at 20 (“No state would like to share technical information which could be used to understand, and probe more deeply into, its scien243
244
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prompted harsh criticism, with one commentator noting that “[t]he
basic purpose behind the CoC gets defeated if insufficient, inaccurate and irregular information is provided by states.”248 The incomplete and voluntary information disclosure process also fundamentally undercuts the hoped-for ability of the proposed Code
to help identify “bad sheep.”249
There are few, if any, examples of non-binding, multilateral
codes being used to address significant arms control issues. This
lack of state practice is itself a compelling indication of the unsuitability of soft law instruments in this area. However, in defending
the President’s authority to sign non-binding documents related to
security matters, the U.S. State Department has cited the 2002
Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (the
“HCoC”)250 as a good example of a “similarly non-binding
code.”251 Upon closer inspection, however, not only is the HCoC
unlike the Code in important respects (and unlike other instruments addressing problems posed by weapons of mass destruction), it is better cited as an example of the failure of non-binding
instruments to successfully address security matters—particularly
when those instruments exclude numerous significant state actors.252
tific and technological capabilities”).
248 Id. at 19.
249 Id. at 20 (“Undertaking confidence-building measures through a series of
voluntary disclosures is likely to have limited utility and would not help identify
the ‘bad sheep’ . . . ”).
250
The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (the
HCoC), U.N. Doc. A/57/724, 3.c., (Nov. 25, 2002), available at http://
www.hcoc.at/?tab=what_is_hcoc&page=text_of_the_hcoc
[https://perma.cc/
6TM3-2DPJ] [hereinafter HCoC].
251 Hearing on Nat’l Def. Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 and Oversight of
Previously Authorized Programs Before the Subcomm. on Strategic Forces of the H.
Comm. on Armed Services, 112th Cong. 87 (2013), app., letter from Hon. David S.
Adams, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of State, to
Chairman Turner (March 8, 2012), available at https://fas.org/irp/congress/
2012_hr/space.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7N6-HTNY] [hereinafter HEARING ON
2013 NDAA].
252 See Camille Grand, The Hague Code of Conduct: 10 Years of Combating Ballistic Proliferation, 74 NON-PROLIFERATION MONTHLY 1 (Special Issue 2013), available at
http://www.cesim.fr/documents/onp/eng/74.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5LUS2QVN] (noting that “[the HCoC’s] limits are well publicized; as a non-legally
binding instrument, it forbids neither the possession, production, nor the development of ballistic missiles and does not impose any onerous constraints on possessor States. As such, it is not comparable with the major international conventions that deal with weapons of mass destruction.”); A Brief Overview of Norms
Development in Outer Space, supra note 60, at 6 (noting that the utility of the HCoC
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At the outset, it should be noted that the HCoC constitutes a
much more limited attempt than the Code to address international
security matters and does not present states like the United States
with any new arms control-type constraints.253 As noted by one
congressman during hearings related to the funding of national security space activities, the HCoC imposed no restraints on U.S. military operations while, in contrast, an Executive Summary of the
Joint Staff Operations assessment of the proposed Code stated that
“[i]f the United States were to make a good-faith effort at implementing the requirements of the draft code, there could be operation[al] impacts on U.S. military space operations in several areas.”254
Furthermore, unlike the broad scope and objectives of the
Code, the HCoC attempts only to make modest inroads in restricting the proliferation of one specific weapon system (ballistic missiles). In addition, the very limited commitments that states undertake when they subscribe to the HCoC are phrased in even weaker
and more ambiguous terms than those contained in the Code.255
Notwithstanding the limited scope and other shortcomings of
the HCoC, its ability to have any meaningful impact has been further diminished by its fractional subscription. It is particularly
framework has been criticized “because of . . . the absence of several key states
from the list of signatories”).
253 The different nature and purposes of the HCoC and the Code were highlighted during hearings in the U.S. Congress. In sharply criticizing Administration efforts to compare the HCoC with the Code, the Chairman of the Strategic
Forces Subcommittee of the U.S. House Armed Services Committee asked
“[W]hat was it that the U.S. was doing in 2002 that it no longer did as a result of
subscription to The Hague Code? Were we proliferating ballistic missiles before
the code?” HEARING ON 2013 NDAA, supra note 251, at 18.
254 Congressman Michael Turner, HEARING ON 2013 NDAA, supra note 251, at
18 (In further contrasting the impact of the HCoC with the Code, Congressman
Turner asked, “What impact on U.S. military and intelligence operations was
there from The Hague Code of Conduct? What binding regulations were issued
on the Department of Defense and IC as a result of U.S. subscription to The Hague
Code . . . ?”).
255 For example, cf. HCoC, supra note 250, at 3.c (which requires the subscribing states “to exercise maximum possible restraint in the development, testing and
deployment of Ballistic Missiles . . . including, where possible to reduce national
holdings of such missiles . . . ”) (emphasis added) to Code, supra note 32, at 1.2,
4.2, 4.3 (ICoC provisions which address “outer space activities involving all space
objects launched into Earth orbit or beyond” and requires subscribing states to “refrain from any action which brings about, directly or indirectly, damage, or destruction, of space objects unless such action is justified” and “to limit, to the greatest
extent practicable, any activities in the conduct of the routine space operations”)
(emphasis added).
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handicapped since “the majority of Asian countries that contribute
to the challenge of missile proliferation remain outside the mechanism.”256 The lack of many significant actors in the HCoC regime,
or in any other fractional soft law regime that attempts to address
security matters, fundamentally undermines any credibility it may
have as an international security tool.257 Thus, in the absence of
some mechanism to ensure the inclusion of the key actors in the
Code, it has been argued that the Code “is likely to see a repeat of
the experience with the HCoC in which most Asian countries of
proliferation concern have chosen to remain outside the mechanism.”258
The HCoC is thus an instructive example regarding soft law instruments, but not a positive one. As noted by one commentator,
its limitations as a fractionalized soft law instrument are selfevident, as it appears to have done very little to limit the spread of
ballistic missile technology.259 With many key states refusing to
subscribe to the HCoC and many signatory states failing to implement it, the HCoC underlines the limited value of so-called
“norms” in non-legally binding documents in which “there is no
Grand, supra note 252, at 1 (noting how “[in] Asia and the Middle East,
adherence to the Code is more the exception than the rule. Brazil, China, India,
Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and Syria are all yet to sign . . . ”).
257
Lucia Marta, The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation: “Lessons Learned” for the European Union Draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space
Activities, EUR. SPACE POL’Y INST. (2010), http://www.nonproliferation.eu/
web/documents/nonproliferationpapers/integrating-without-quite-breakingthe-rules-the-e-44.pdf [https://perma.cc/RW6G-89DU] (noting that the lack of
participation by significant countries in the HCoC ,including North Korea, Iran,
China , emerging actors in the space sector like Brazil, Mexico and Saudi Arabia,
and most other middle eastern and south Asian countries “undermines the credibility of the Code not only in terms of its universalization and the potential to create an international customary law, but also in terms of its credibility as an international security tool”).
258 Timothy Farnsworth, U.S. Backs Efforts to Draft Space Code, ARMS CONTROL
ASS’N, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_03/US_Backs_Efforts_to_Draft_
Space_Code [https://perma.cc/RZY7-96JZ]; Micah Zenko, A Code of Conduct for
Outer Space, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (2011), http://i.cfr.org/content/
publications/attachments/Policy_Innovation_Memo10_Zenko.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/F67J-UCKV] (“Along current trend lines, the EU code will likely suffer
the same fate as the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation,
which was endorsed by 132 states, but not Brazil, China, or India, much less Iran
and North Korea).
259 Kueter, supra note 116, at 4 (noting that the HCoC has “done little to slow
the spread of ballistic missile technology. The utility of the ballistic missile as a
warfighting instrument is such that nations either have elected to stay outside the
regime or ignore it”).
256
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obligation created and thus there is potentially a higher chance for
weak adherence.”260
In light of the issues discussed above, it is not surprising that
many advocates of the Code stress the crucial need for all interested nations, particularly all major space stakeholders, to sign the Code
in order for it to have any chance of success.261 Without the participation of these states, the proposed Code is doomed to become
part of an unusual class of particularly ineffective soft law instruments. Furthermore, in the case of arms control measures, potential dangers lurk for states like the United States that choose to
subscribe to such fractionalized soft law instruments and attempt
to comply in good faith with their restrictions.
4.3. “Non-Binding Norm-Creating” and the Democracy Deficit
One suggested advantage of soft law instruments over hard
law is that they are easier for states to negotiate and conclude
while retaining the ability to later serve as the possible basis for legally binding obligations. This advantage flows from the capacity
of soft law instruments to be both “non-binding” and “normcreating.” Yet soft law’s non-binding and norm-creating qualities
may pose a dilemma for the legislatures of democratic states, as illustrated by the unfolding controversy in the United States over
the possible adoption of the proposed Code. At first glance it may
seem surprising that a state’s legislative body would be concerned
about a legally non-binding instrument, but such a document takes
260
A Brief Overview of Norms Development in Outer Space, supra note 60, at 7
(noting how the failure of signatory states to implement the HCoC “underlines
the extent of the reach of such types of norms as, in that they are non-legally binding documents, there is no obligation created and thus there is potentially a higher
chance for weak adherence.”); Lele, supra note 79, at 5, 6 (“In reality, mechanisms
like HCoC or the proposed space CoC have extremely limited relevance and actually serve no purpose beyond offering a ‘feel good’ notion. It would be naïve to
think that states actually care for such non-binding mechanisms”).
261
See, e.g., Stefan A. Kaiser, Why States Should Sign the Code of Conduct for
Outer Space Activities?, in DECODING THE CODE, supra note 30, at 88, 90 (“there is
one crucial prerequisite for the success of the code of conduct. It needs to reflect a
broad consensus among the space-faring nations. All major space-faring nations
need to sign”); Elatawy, supra note 84, at 50 (noting in order for a code such as the
ICoC to beneficial, it must, among other things, be “negotiated widely among all
states in a proper multilateral venue”); Samson, supra note 229, at 139 (arguing
that, at a minimum, “What is needed is the agreement of key space stakeholders
that the guidelines set down in a code of conduct are for the best”).
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on new significance when a state’s executive unilaterally (without
involving the legislature) proclaims that the adopted instrument
will be promoted by that state as a basis for creating new binding
rules of customary international law.
4.4. The Code Controversy Within the U.S. Government
In contrast to the space policies of previous administrations, the
Obama Administration has expressed a desire to promote new
types of collaborative activities in space and a willingness to consider proposals for space-related arms control agreements (albeit
with significant caveats.)262 It has also indicated a willingness to
consider a variety of new soft law mechanisms for outer space, including those which contribute to the development of what it described as “norms of behavior for responsible space operations.”263
Consistent with its new space policies, the U.S. government expressed tentative support in 2009 for the proposed Code, subject to
its formulation as a legally non-binding instrument.264 Stressing
the power of soft, non-binding instruments to build norms, a fact
sheet released by DoD in 2011 noted that “[t]he United States is
working closely with the European Union on a draft international
Code of Conduct, which could serve as an important first set of
norms of responsible behavior.”265
On February 2, 2011, thirty-seven members of the U.S. Senate
expressed significant concerns about the proposed Code in a letter
262 Broad & Chang, supra note 171, at A19 (noting that the new National Security Space Strategy states that Washington will “consider proposals and concepts for arms control measures if they are equitable, effectively verifiable and enhance the national security of the United States and its allies”).
263
National Security Space Strategy, supra note 12, at 5; National Space Law
Policy of the United States, at 2, 7 (June 28, 2010), available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national_space_policy_6-2810.pdf [https://perma.cc/TA72-4BZM] (stating that “[t]he United States will support development of data standards, best practices, transparency and confidencebuilding measures, and norms of behavior for responsible space operations”).
264 Bill Gertz, New Space-Arms Control Initiative Draws Concern, WASH. TIMES,
Jan. 16, 2012, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/
jan/16/new-space-arms-control-initiative-draws-concern/
[https://perma.cc/
VZ8R-GV8U] (quoting a Dec. 9, 2009, State Department cable expressing concern
about the use of legally binding language in the draft EU Code).
265 Fact Sheet: International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, supra note
237.
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to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.266 On January 17, 2012, the
State Department announced that the United States would not sign
the EU’s current draft of a proposed Code, but that it would nonetheless “join with the European Union and other space-faring
countries to develop an international code of conduct for outer
space activities.”267
While several ranking members of U.S. Congress indicated in a
letter to President Obama of January 18, 2012, that they applauded
the decision to not sign the current version of the draft Code because it presented “significant policy and operational concerns,”
they also expressed grave reservations about the proposed use by
the Executive Branch of a non-binding soft law mechanism to
promote possible restrictions on US military and intelligence capabilities and space.268 Of particular importance for purposes of this
article, the congressmen questioned the appropriateness of the
Code’s non-binding, norm-creating approach as applied to arms
control in space. They argued that the Code, if adopted, could be
used “as a starting point” for the negotiation of an international
arms control agreement, and further suggested that it could “establish the foundation for a future arms control regime that
binds the United States without the approval of Congress.”269
Such a legally binding impact on the United States could presumably take place through the codification of Code provisions in future
international conventions (although this would require congressional involvement in order to be internally binding on the United
States), and/or their transformation through state practice into
rules of customary international law which would be binding on
all states.
Furthermore, the perceived advantage of non-binding instruments to harmonize international standards by generating uniform
domestic legal requirements was directly criticized by the congressmen, who noted that although the Administration argued that
the draft Code would be “non-binding and voluntary, the implementing regulations surely would be binding.”270
266 Letter from Senators to Hillary Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State (Feb. 2, 2011),
supra note 83.
267 Farnsworth, supra note 258.
268 Letter from Rep. Michael Turner et al, supra note 175.
269
Id. (arguing that this approach “would bypass the established constitutional processes by which the United States becomes bound by international
law”).
270 Id. (further arguing that “[b]ecoming a signatory on this type of a Code
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Writing in response to the congressman on behalf of the
President, a senior State Department official noted that the Code
“would not be a treaty or international agreement that would impose legal obligations on the United States” and that it was not “a
legally-binding arms control agreement.”271 While this is an accurate statement, it is also a narrow one that does not speak to the
possibility that the Code could generate legally binding domestic
regulations, serve as the basis for future legally binding agreements, or give rise to new legally binding norms of customary international law.
In response to concerns expressed by some members of Congress that the proposed Code represented “arms control by the
back door,” administration officials did not dispute that the substance of the draft Code related to arms control issues, only that it
was not “arms control” because the Code itself is “not legally binding.”272 Nevertheless, some members of Congress argued that this
process could result in legally binding obligations and related policies being approved without their input and outside the normal
process for considering and approving congressional-executive
agreements or ratifying treaties.273
While the Obama Administration has correctly emphasized
that the proposed Code is not a proposed international agreement
and is thus not subject to the procedural and substantive rules
governing the consideration, authorization and conclusion of international agreements, the potentially legally binding impact of
the Code through its contribution to the formation of customary
international law is another matter. 274 In that regard, the executive’s unilateral adoption of such a soft law instrument would
leave the legislative branch in a poor position to affect what it
of Conduct without Congressional approval appears intended to implement
international policy with which the Congress has not expressed concurrence or
approval. It appears that the Department of Defense and possibly the Intelligence Community would have to issue departmental implementation regulations that would impact both our national and economic security”).
271
HEARING ON 2013 NDAA, supra note 251 (Letter from David S. Adams,
Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, to Michael Turner, Chairman).
272 Schulte & Schaffer, supra note 44, at 14 (“One concern [that we have heard
about the code] is this arms control by the back door? This is not arms control. I
mean, this is a voluntary code. It is not legally binding”).
273 Letter from Rep. Michael Turner et al., supra note 175.
274 See 1 U.S. Code § 112b (the “Case-Zablocki Act”), which imposes regulations only on those documents that are legally binding international agreements
(including the requirement that the document be transmitted to Congress).
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views as an objectionable step by the United States in leading the
way in the potential development of new rules of customary international law that could restrict U.S. military capabilities and operations in space.
As noted above, arms control measures (defined by the U.S.
Congress as any action that “would obligate the United States to
reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United
States in a militarily significant manner”) are the subject of a special statutory regime (requiring such obligations to be made pursuant to the treaty-making power or with affirmative legislation by
the Congress).275 Questions regarding the applicability of this statutory regime have escalated the conflict between the U.S. legislative and executive branches over the proposed Code.276 The result
was the enactment in 2014 of an unprecedented piece of legislation
entitled “Limitation on International Agreements Concerning Outer Space Activities,” found in Section 913 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (“Section 913”).277
Not surprisingly, Section 913 reaffirmed the requirement that
any obligation to reduce or limit the armed forces or armaments of
the United States in outer space in a militarily significant manner
be accomplished only pursuant to a treaty or specific statutory authorization.278 However, Section 913 also broke new ground by es22 U.S. Code § 2573(b).
See Jack M. Beard, Soft Law as an Impediment to the Regulation of Space Activities with Military Implications: A View from the United States Congress, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SPACE 2014, 699–717 (2015).
277 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112239, 126 Stat. 1632 (2013), codified at 51 U.S.C. § 30701, Note (2013), available at
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr4310enr/pdf/BILLS-112hr4310
enr.pdf [https://perma.cc/B2S2-C4XV] [hereinafter the 2013 NDAA]. The President had previously threatened to veto the Act based on the unacceptable way
Section 913 and other provisions in the bill impeded the President’s ability to execute new defense strategies and allocate resources and the manner in which Section 913 specifically could “encroach on the Executive's exclusive authority to
conduct foreign relations and could severely hamper U.S. ability to conduct bilateral space cooperation activities with key allies”). See Statement of Administration Policy, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, H.R. 4310
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013, available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/112/
saphr4310r_20120515.pdf [https://perma.cc/CZ9J-79DC].
278
The first certification provision in Section 913 requires the Secretary of
Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of National
Intelligence to jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees a certification that such agreement “will be equitable, enhance national security, and
have no militarily significant impact on the ability of the United States to conduct
military or intelligence activities.” 2013 NDAA, supra note 277, § 913(a)(2).
275
276
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tablishing several onerous certification requirements, one of which
may cast a long shadow over America’s ability to continue to play
a leading role in helping to form rules of customary international
law for outer space. In particular, Section 913(a)(1) contains unusual criteria, which appear to prevent soft law instruments like the
Code from serving as a basis for both future international agreements and rules of customary international law.
Among other things, Section 913(a)(1) requires the President to
submit to appropriate congressional committees a certification that
“such agreement has no legally-binding effect or basis for limiting
the activities of the United States in outer space.”279 In reluctantly
signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2013, President Obama issued a statement indicating that certain
provisions in this Act, including Section 913, “could interfere with
my constitutional authority to conduct the foreign relations of the
United States.”280
The legal significance, if any, of presidential signing statements
in this context is hotly contested.281 A full examination, however,
of the constitutional status of presidential signing statements, related separation of powers issues, and the capacity of the President
to lawfully engage in a wide spectrum of executive acts related to
international affairs is beyond the scope of this paper. However,
other issues arising from the divided and conflicted participation
of the American democracy (or any other democracy) in the formation of customary international law deserve special attention
here, particularly as they relate to the adoption of a soft law instrument on the basis of its non-binding yet norm-creating character.

Id., at § 913(a)(1) (emphasis added).
Statement by the President on H.R. 4310, THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE
PRESS
SEC’Y,
Jan.
3,
2013,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/01/03/statement-president-hr-4310 [https://perma.cc/YG5F-QHPJ]
(further declaring that “[i]n these instances, my Administration will interpret and
implement these provisions in a manner that does not interfere with my constitutional authority to conduct diplomacy”).
281
For a discussion of related issues, see Beard, supra note 276, at 10581–
10582.
279
280
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4.5. The Code, “Norm-Creating,”, and the Formation of Customary
International Law
Repeated statements by U.S. officials that the proposed Code
entails no legal obligations because it is not a legally binding
agreement, unfortunately, speak to only one dimension of the possible legal significance of this soft law instrument. As Senator Ben
Nelson remarked to administration officials in Congressional hearings on the proposed Code, “[i]t may not be a treaty, but as you
well know, it will establish international norms amongst nations.”282 In fact, lines separating the promotion of new “norms”
found in legally non-binding instruments (that the United States
expects other countries to follow), and efforts to establish new
binding rules of customary international law are easily blurred, especially as U.S. Executive Branch officials continue to promote the
Code as an instrument for setting “norms for which responsible
space-faring nations would conform their conduct.”283
For purposes of legal analysis, non-binding “norms” or guidelines found in soft law instruments must be distinguished from legally binding rules of customary international law (which are
sometimes also referred to as “norms”). Customary international
law consists of a set of legal obligations arising from the practice of
states and is recognized as a “leading, well-respected source of international law, fully on par with treaties.”284 In the words of the
American Law Institute's Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States, customary international law emanates “from a
general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a
sense of legal obligation.”285

282 Hearing to Receive Testimony on Military Space Programs in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2013 and the Future Years Defense Program,
Before the Subcomm. on Strat. Forces of the Comm. on Armed Services, 112th Cong. 3
(March 21, 2012) available at http://www.smdc.army.mil/CG/2012/FY13SA
SCSFSpaceTranscript.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2EZ-QY3L].
283
See, e.g.,id. at 19, (testimony of Madelyn Creedon, Assistant Sec’y of Defense for Global Strat. Aff.) (stating that “[t]here are a number of responsible behaviors that we hope this code will identify and then set what would be the
norms for which responsible space-faring nations would conform their conduct”).
284 David A. Koplow, ASAT-isfaction: Customary International Law and the Regulation of Anti-Satellite Weapons, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1187, 1222 (2009) [hereinafter
Koplow].
285 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102.2
(1987).
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Customary international law has played a key role in space.
For example, many of the most important and fundamental principles of space law found in the Outer Space Treaty, have been described as essentially codifying existing customary international
law.286 Significantly, the customary international law version of
these rules has achieved wider, “more comprehensive geographic
coverage” than the treaty versions.287 As discussed in Part 2 above,
customary international law rules governing space activities have
often emerged from soft law instruments, including, in some circumstances, from U.N. General Assembly Resolutions.288
A non-binding principle contained in a soft law instrument
may thus become a binding “rule of customary international law,”
but only if it enjoys sufficient conforming general practice by states
and is ultimately accepted as law.289 It should be noted that even if
a document like the proposed Code is initially declared by all subscribing states to be a legally non-binding instrument, this may not
prevent it from later contributing to the formation of a rule of cus286
Vladlen S. Vereshchetin & Gennady M. Danilenko, Custom as a Source of
International Law of Outer Space, 13 J. SPACE L. 22, 25 (1985) (noting further that “the
analysis of the practice of states before the conclusion of the 1967 Outer Space
Treaty shows that historically custom was the first source of the international law
of outer space”); NANDASIRI JASENTULIYANA, SPACE LAW: DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE
46 (1992) (describing the Outer Space Treaty as “the Magna Carta of international
space law” and noting that it was “built on several principles already enunciated
in [the] 1963 . . . Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space”).
287 Koplow, supra note 284, at 1234. The International Court of Justice maintains that customary international law rules underlying an international “convention continue to exist erga omnes for both parties and non-parties.” See MARK
EUGEN VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES: A MANUAL ON THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERRELATION OF SOURCES 151–52 (1997) (noting also
two alternative views when pre-existing customary international law rules are
codified in a convention: that these rules may be “crowd[ed] out” by the convention, or that they may simply parallel the convention, “at least as regards nonparties”).
288
Frans von der Dunk, Contradiction in Terminis or Realpolitik? A Qualified
Plea for a Role of ‘Soft Law’ in the Context of Space Activities, in SOFT LAW IN SPACE,
supra note 27, at 31, 32 (noting that the origins of space law can be traced to “a
handful of internal administrative and/or non-legally binding United Nations
General Assembly resolutions between 1958 and 1963 . . . .”); see supra notes 57–61
and accompanying text (discussing the limited circumstances in which U.N. General Assembly Resolutions form the basis for binding rules of customary international law).
289
Continental Shelf case (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), Judgment,
ICJ Reports 1985, pp. 29–30, § 27 (3 June 1985) available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&case=68&code=lm&p3=4
[https://perma.cc/J9FH-9LSD].
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tomary international law. For example, during the consideration
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights at a 1948 session of
the U.N. General Assembly, the U.S. Representative, Mrs. Franklin
D. Roosevelt, emphasized that, “It is not a treaty; it is not an international agreement. It is not and does not purport to be a statement of law or of legal obligation.”290 However, after years of conforming state practice and reaffirmation of the norms in the
Declaration by the United States, it was not difficult for a U.S. federal court to later declare that one of those norms, the prohibition
of torture, had become a binding rule on all countries under customary international law.291
The process by which customary international law (“CIL”) is
formed is not, however, without its critics. For example, Professor
J. Patrick Kelly has strongly criticized the lack of democratic legitimacy in this process on several levels, arguing that “the majority
of nations and peoples of the world rarely participate in the creation of customary rules that limit their policy choices and sovereignty,” and that this “democracy deficit” broadly infects the process of CIL norm formation.292
It is true that traditional international law doctrine has generally treated states and governments as opaque “black boxes,” and
has thus “ignore[d] their internal observance of democracy as a
relevant factor affecting their capacity to have a voice in international lawmaking.”293 Yet, even while most international law
scholars may be unwilling to fully embrace Professor Kelly’s argument that the methodologies of all the major normative theories
of customary international law eviscerate the democratic legitimacy of CIL norms, there is still value in recognizing and encouraging
19 DEP’T. OF STATE BULL. 751 (1948).
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1980) (“This prohibition
[the right to be free from torture] has become part of customary international law,
as evidenced and defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General
Assembly Resolution 217 (III)(A) (Dec. 10, 1948) which states, in the plainest of
terms, “no one shall be subjected to torture”).
292 J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L
L. 449, 518–520 (2000) (arguing that the democratic legitimacy of customary international law (CIL) norms is undermined by both the limited number of states that
participate in formulating those norms and by the lack of any participation by
people represented by states: “much of CIL is determined by the academic and
judicial elites or by the practices of a minority of states without the participation
or direct assent of the majority of states compromising the legitimacy of CIL
norms”).
293
BRIAN D. LEPARD, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A NEW THEORY WITH
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 156 (2010).
290
291
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state participation in this process that also reflects the participation
of the people that these states are presumed to represent.294
International legal obligations which are made pursuant to
treaties or other international agreements often involve legislative
institutions and thus, at least in democratic states, involve the participation of the elected representatives of the people in those
states. But in the case of other activities involving a state’s foreign
affairs, including the signing of legally non-binding documents
that may give rise to customary international law, in some countries the executive alone may speak for the government and the
people.295
The ongoing controversy in the United States over the possible
signature by the President of the proposed Code implicates issues
larger than domestic partisan politics and interesting separation of
power issues within the U.S. constitutional framework. Among
other things, the Code controversy highlights the limitations of
non-binding soft law instruments to generate legally binding
“norms” of conduct under customary international law. The unu294
Id. (Professor Lepard argues that “[f]inally, in the case of all
norms . . . greater weight should be given to the views of states that have some
mechanism for taking the views of their citizens and other inhabitants into account, such as democratic elections or consultations.” He suggests that such an
approach enhances the “democratic legitimacy” of customary international law”
without “reject[ing] the legitimacy of the customary lawmaking process as being
irremediably ‘undemocratic’ by nature”).
295
The extent of an executive’s sole powers in foreign affairs varies with
each state’s constitutional framework. In the United States, the standard citation
for the president’s power in the area of foreign affairs is found in United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (noting that “[i]n this vast external realm [of foreign affairs], with its important, complicated, delicate and
manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation . . . . As Marshall said in his great argument of March 7,
1800, in the House of Representatives, ‘The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations’").
Although a detailed discussion of this subject is beyond the scope of this article,
such absolute statements about presidential authority risk over-simplifying the
complex separation of powers regime in the U.S. legal system. Even the CurtissWright case is less than it appears, since it did not involve the question of independent powers of the president, but “whether Congress had delegated [its] legislative power too broadly when it authorized the president to declare an arms embargo in South America.” Louis Fisher, The Law: Presidential Inherent Power: The
“Sole Organ” Doctrine, PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 139, 143 (March 2007). Rather than
providing a clear roadmap for Congress and the President to share powers in the
conduct of foreign affairs, one presidential scholar has suggested that the Constitution is instead “an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American
foreign policy.” EDWIN S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT - OFFICE AND POWERS 1787–1957
at 171 (1957).
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sual case of the executive and legislative branches of a major democracy explicitly taking opposite views of the suitability of a soft
law instrument (in this case the proposed Code) to serve as a basis
for future international legal obligations, threatens not only the future of U.S. participation in the Code, but also the key role that the
United States has long played in the development of the international legal regime governing activities in space.296 If the United
States were to approve the Code under these circumstances, it
would also give the Code an even more uncertain status, further
undermining its relevance as well as the underlying commitments
of subscribing states.
The significance for international space law of the dispute over
the Code between the U.S. Executive and Legislative branches may
be far-reaching. Although partisan disputes related to international activities are hardly unusual in the United States, the formal and
unprecedented action taken by the United States Congress to restrict the potential legal impact of the Code potentially sets the
stage for a broad and unfortunate attack on the use of soft law instruments as a basis for forming future binding obligations in
space under customary international law.
The controversy over the Code in the United States highlights
the limitations of soft instruments when they are used in place of
legally binding international agreements and the process whereby
which such legally binding agreements are adopted. It also illustrates the dangers that such non-binding documents may pose if
they are used by the executives of states to build norms in such a
way that they further contribute to a “democracy deficit” in customary international law. This is especially true for democratic
states in the area of arms control where important issues of national security are likely to call for processes which reflect a national
consensus, and thus involve the participation of the people
through their elected representatives in order to obtain broad public support for the agreement.297 Soft law instruments may thus be
296
See, e.g., EDYTHE E. WEEKS, OUTER SPACE DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND SPACE LAW: A METHOD FOR ELUCIDATING SEEDS at 51–54, 128 (2012)
(noting how in the early epoch of the space era, the United States played a key
role in building the foundation of the legal framework for space—especially the
Kennedy Administration’s contributions in facilitating the progress of international space law and the Johnson Administration’s subsequent role in “keeping up
the momentum of international space lawmaking”—and how the United States
has continued to play “a key role in influencing outer space development regime
change” through subsequent epochs of outer space development).
297
Richard B. Bilder, Formal Treaties and Tacit Agreements: An Exchange, 41
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a problematic substitute for legally binding agreements on several
levels, particularly when used to address arms control and security
issues.
5. GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR SOLUTIONS IN SPACE
Many challenges now confront states in their use of outer
space, but none pose a greater existential threat than the possibility
that debris generated by human activities may render space unsafe
and unusable for hundreds or even thousands of years. However,
the insecure strategic environment in space means many proposed
cooperative measures will not be able to effectively address this
threat and may instead only increase dangerous risks.
The international community generally addresses the dissimilar problems of space debris and arms control as separate areas of
concern. This is because the legal and political framework which
underlies efforts to manage the critical problem of orbital space
debris (which also includes the domestic laws and administrative
regulations of many states), and the framework which addresses
arms control issues in space, relate to fundamentally different subject areas. Nonetheless, the two subject areas may implicate parallel concerns or involve interdependent problems, as evidenced by
the Code’s emphasis on preventing an arms race and regulating
military activities in outer space while reducing the creation of orbital space debris.298
Within the context of these different subject areas and frameBULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 51, 52 (April 1985). In view of the importance of
obtaining broad congressional and public support for arms control arrangements,
is it wise for the president to bypass normal constitutional agreement-making
procedures? Formal arms control treaties provide the requisite degree of predictability and assurance . . . . Moreover . . . [i]f the agreement is approved, it is likely
to reflect a national consensus and have considerable support and stability. In the
United States, where arms control agreements have “almost invariably been negotiated as treaties,” it has further been argued that the gravity of the issues addressed in such agreements “creates a presumption in favor of treaties with full
Senate participation in the process of ratification. See ROBERT E. WILLIAMS, JR. &
PAUL R. VIOTTI, ARMS CONTROL: HISTORY, THEORY, AND POLICY – VOLUME 1:
FOUNDATIONS OF ARMS CONTROL at 45 (2012).
298 Some authors further suggest that lethal debris represents its own “haphazard and inadvertent weaponization of space.” See Michael Krepon, Space Code
of
Conduct
Mugged
in
New
York,
Aug.
4,
2015,
http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/404712/space-code-of-conductmugged-in-new-york/ [https://perma.cc/7DWW-KG7X].
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works, the search continues for the “next step” towards meaningful international collaboration in addressing the most acute problems confronting the international community in space, particularly the problem of orbital space debris. The proposed Code, a
flawed soft law variant, is not a promising step. Soft law is not,
however, the only available solution or basis for that next step. Instead, certain alternative principles emerged from the preceding
analysis, which may help guide states in their next attempt to design other more effective instruments, regimes, and approaches to
advance the long-term and sustainable use of outer space.
5.1. Pursue Hard Law Solutions with the Leading Spacefaring States
Meaningful initiatives to regulate weapons and military activities in space cannot succeed when their design is divorced from the
reality of the security dilemmas and perceived threats that states
face. While soft law instruments may give the appearance of progress, they notoriously achieve little on their own in addressing
critical security issues in space.299 In this realm, soft law instruments unfortunately do not assist states in conveying credible
commitments to each other, providing the necessary assurances to
prevent defensive defections from international regimes, or creating clear obligations to serve as the basis for effective monitoring
and verification regimes designed to prevent offensive defections.
Instead, soft law’s shortcomings—linked to design choices that
weaken commitments along the dimensions of precision or obligation or both—inspire uncertainty, reduce confidence, and dramatically diminish the effectiveness of any arms control measure in
space.
The benefits of hard law regimes and the disadvantages of soft
law instruments in the field of arms control are compelling. This
helps explain why, despite continuing and sometimes intense diplomatic efforts to promote the adoption of the Code, a wide variety
of experts from numerous space-faring countries agree that a hard
law approach is ultimately needed to deal with the greatest chal299 Aoki, supra note 57, at 85 (“[O]nce critical national security interest is concerned, then, only legally-binding rules can govern the activities of individual nation.”); Elatawy, supra note 84, at 50 (“There is a necessity for further measures to
govern outer space activities through the negotiation and conclusion of further
legally binding instrument(s)”).
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lenges confronting the international community in space.300 It is
also consistent with demands by several major space stakeholders
(including Brazil, India, South Africa, Russia and China) that work
on the Code “should not prejudice or delay the elaboration of legally-binding instruments to strengthen the existing legal framework for outer space.”301
As previously noted, however, proponents of soft law approaches often view legally binding instruments for space activities
as too difficult to achieve, pointing to the lack of any new hard law
agreements since 1979. Unfortunately, the attention, time and government resources dedicated to promoting the Code appear to be
diverting efforts from more meaningful and important work on
any new legally binding agreements.302 The lengthy, continuing
state-sponsored deliberations related to the Code present only an
illusion of progress, one that diminishes interest in more effective
legally binding agreements, reduces pressure on states to pursue
such alternatives, creates the false impression of agreement when
there is none, and induces false expectations that may later lead to
disagreement and increased conflict when those expectations are
disappointed.303
Commentators who are not optimistic about hard law approaches in space have suggested that the different and apparently
irreconcilable interests of different states are responsible for preventing the conclusion of any new legally binding multilateral
agreement in the field of space law since 1979.304 In this environment, bottom-up soft law approaches may continue to be an option
for progress in some areas, particularly where consensus can be
300
See, e.g., Juqian, supra note 159, at 43 ("Though voluntary ‘rules of the
road’ have their advantages, ‘soft law’ is not enough for dealing with more and
more complicated space activities. Rules with legally binding force are better for
the international community”); Fermin Romero Vazquez, EU Efforts for an ICoC:
A Mexican Perspective, in AWAITING LAUNCH, supra note 33, at 137, 141 (“Countries
such as Mexico have argued the need for legally binding instruments to develop
space law”); Lele, supra note 79, at 20 (“India, being an important player in the
Space arena, needs to lobby for a transparent and binding CoC, which would
eventually help in realising Space security”).
301 Meyer, supra note 227.
302
K. R. Sridhara Murthi & Mukund Rao, ICoC: Perspective for India, in
AWAITING LAUNCH, supra note 33, at 159, 167 (“[T]here have been fears that [the
ICoC] may slow down or divert efforts to build legally binding commitments that
are essential for assuring the safety, security and sustainability of space activities”).
303 BILDER, supra note 70, at 38.
304 Juqian, supra note 159, at 43.
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achieved on various technical and procedural issues and incorporated in non-binding standards and guidelines (which in turn may
ultimately lead to hard rules in conventions or customary international law).
However, the security matters addressed by the Code are not
conducive to resolution by soft law approaches, nor do they comprise an area in which soft law instruments effectively lay the
foundation for the development of legally binding rules. Soft law
in this context may instead present an obstacle to the development
of such hard rules, even more so when ambiguities in these instruments allow subscribing states to take competing positions and
approaches with respect to key rules.305
Rather than forming an agreed basis for the development of future norms, non-binding and indeterminate instruments in these
situations may, as noted, be nothing more than a form of a “deferred confrontation” or simply reflect a profound lack of consensus on issues that are necessary to conclude a legally binding
agreement.306 Instead of creating a solid foundation on which to
build new legally binding obligations, soft law here may instead
make such new legally binding norms even more difficult to
achieve.
The design choices for the Code thus appear to reflect a large
degree of continuing disagreement—and this lack of consensus is
further demonstrated by the continuing unwillingness of several
key spacefaring nations to subscribe to it. The struggles of the
Code do not, however, indicate a need for more soft law. Instead,
they indicate a need for targeted hard law initiatives (involving the
participation of all major space stakeholders) to serve as a first step
in addressing the most widely acknowledged threats confronting
the safety and security of objects in space.

305 Ambiguous language used in an instrument to paper over differences between states may have a variety of negative effects on long-term efforts to develop
binding international agreements, because such language can, among other
things, “foster not only a false sense that an issue is no longer of concern because
it has been resolved; it can also foster dangerous misconceptions of what has been
gained or conceded in an agreement.” See Kittrie, supra note 123, at 1703–1704.
306
Chayes & Shelton, supra note 134, at 525 (noting that “recourse to nonbinding norms may reflect a lack of consensus on the issues that make it impossible to conclude a binding agreement . . . ”).
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5.2. Avoid Arms Control Traps in Space
Any successful effort to achieve legally binding restrictions on
military activities or weapons in space must focus on specific, definable, and limited objectives, or run afoul of issues that have historically ensured deadlock among suspicious and insecure adversaries.307 Some seemingly desirable goals, however, are likely to
ensure failure.
The first such problematic goal involves attempting to use arms
control agreements or other instruments to comprehensively ensure peace in space. Unfortunately, the integration of modern military systems on earth, sea, air, and space guarantees that, at some
point, states seeking to disrupt or deny the ability of an adversary
(such as the United States) to project power will find space capabilities to be a particularly appealing target, especially in the early
stages of a crisis or conflict.308 The presence of so many things of
military value in space thus makes actions by an adversary to neutralize, disrupt or destroy these things likely during a major conflict on earth.309
The second problematic arms control goal in space that seems
certain to ensure stalemate involves attempting to define and prohibit military technologies with a view to broadly prevent the
weaponization of space. Clearly defining a space weapon for purposes of any legally binding arms control agreement is a daunting
task, one that is made particularly challenging by the “essentially
307
BRUCE W. MACDONALD, CHINA, SPACE WEAPONS, AND U.S. SECURITY 30
(Council on Foreign Relations Special Report No. 38, 2008) available at
http://www.cfr.org/china/china-space-weapons-us-security/p16707 [https://
perma.cc/6YJ8-JYE2] (arguing that sweeping arms control proposals are unlikely
to be verifiable and that historically such overbroad proposals “have acted more
as a delaying tactic than serious policy”).
308 Schulte & Schaffer, supra note 44, at 10 (“For an adversary seeking to disrupt or deny the ability of the United States to project power, space capabilities
may provide an appealing target set, especially early in a crisis or conflict”); Gordon G. Chang, The Space Arms Race Begins, FORBES, Nov. 6, 2009,
http://www.forbes.com/2009/11/05/space-arms-race-china-united-statesopinions-columnists-gordon-g-chang.html [https://perma.cc/8B44-K4TP] (quoting the Chief of the Chinese Air Force in an article in the People’s Liberation Army
Daily as saying “Competition between military forces is developing towards the
sky and space, it is extending beyond the atmosphere and even into outer
space . . . . This development is a historical inevitability and cannot be undone”).
309 Kueter, supra note 172, at 2 (“War will find its way to space because there
are things of military value in space and their denial or destruction would net a
military advantage during a conflict”).
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military nature of space technology.”310 As noted, space technologies are routinely viewed as dual-use in nature, meaning that they
can be readily employed for both civilian and military uses. Determining the ultimate purpose of many space technologies may
thus depend on discerning the intentions of states, a process perhaps better suited for psychological than legal evaluation.311
Further complicating the classification of space military technologies is the inherent difficulty in distinguishing most space
weapons on the basis of their offensive and defensive roles or even
their specific missions.312 For example, this problem lies at the
heart of debates over the status and future of ballistic missile defense (“BMD”) programs, since the technology underlying BMD
systems and offensive ASAT weapons is often indistinguishable.313
Vague and broad soft law instruments do not resolve this problem,
but create instead their own confusion and insecurity. Vague and
broad provisions in legally binding agreements that do not or cannot distinguish between these missions are similarly problematic.
These issues, particularly difficulties in distinguishing ASAT
and BMD systems, have figured prominently in complicating ne-

310 Aoki, supra note 57, at 60; Frans von der Dunk, Contradictio in Terminis or
Realpolitik? A Qualified Plea for a Role of ‘Soft Law’ in the Context of Space Activities, in
SOFT LAW IN SPACE, supra note 27, at 37 (noting that “military and strategic considerations” are “almost always prominently present in the context of space activities”).
311
Jane C. Hu, The Battle for Space, SLATE, Dec. 23 2014,
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/space_20/2014/12/space_
weapon_law_u_s_china_and_russia_developing_dangerous_dual_use
_spacecraft.html [https://perma.cc/94XZ-GPN8] (noting that “[i]t’s difficult—if
not impossible—to determine what counts as a space weapon. Identifying space
weapons has become a psychological game: Experts must infer the intentions of
the nation launching space objects”).
312
David Holloway, The Soviet Perception for Reykjavik: Four Documents, in
IMPLICATIONS OF THE REYKJAVIK SUMMIT ON ITS TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY 45–96, 45,
60 (Sidney D. Drell & George P. Shultz eds., 2007) (“Any space-based system carrying strike weapons (kinetic, energy beam, nuclear) is both offensive and defensive. There is no basis for separating space-based strike systems into offensive
and purely defensive categories.”); Peter Hays, Developments in Ballistic Missile Defences, in CELEBRATING THE SPACE AGE, supra note 205, at 21, 22 (“Even a very limited BMD system will have significant ASAT capabilities. Thus there is significant
overlap of BMD and space weaponization issues, which need to be seen as interlinked issues”).
313
JOAN JOHNSON-FREESE, SPACE AS A STRATEGIC ASSET 7 (2007) (“A missile
that can target another missile in flight (missile defense) can also target orbiting
satellites . . . . From a technical perspective, it is not difficult to conceive of a missile defense system as an offensive antisatellite (ASAT) weapon”).
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gotiations on space weapons over previous decades.314 Similarly,
these concerns were a significant factor in initial U.S. opposition to
the arms control measure proposed by China and Russia (the
“PPWT”) since it prohibits states from placing any type of weapon
in outer space (regardless of its military mission), thus effectively
prohibiting the deployment of space-based missile defense interceptors or other space-based missile defense weapon capabilities.315 Furthermore, even if clear legal restrictions could be developed, verifying compliance with respect to technology in orbit
around Earth would be very difficult (a point conceded even by
China with respect to its own proposed PPWT).316
5.3. Maintain a Focus on the Most Harmful Conduct
The first steps in successfully addressing the greatest threats to
space—which must be consciously undertaken against the backdrop of suspicion, insecurity and fears of a space arms race—are
not sweeping and unverifiable bans on weapons or military technologies.317 Instead, solutions lie in legally binding prohibitions on
specific types of the most harmful conduct, restrictions that are also likely to benefit from more feasible methods of verification.
314
Segey Oznobishchev, Codes of Conduct for Outer Space, in OUTER SPACE:
WEAPONS, DIPLOMACY, AND SECURITY, supra note 165, at 72 (noting that this history
“reveals the enormous complexity of trying to impose treaty-based legal restrictions on space systems”).
315
Letter dated 19 August 2008 from the Permanent Representative of the United
States of America Addressed to the Secretary-General of the Conference Transmitting
Comments on the Draft "Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer
Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT)" as Contained in Document CD/1839 of 29 February 2008, at 4. The latest draft of the PPWT
continues to broadly define the term “weapon in outer space” as “any outer space
object or component thereof which has been produced or converted to destroy,
damage or disrupt the normal functioning of objects in outer space, on the Earth’s
surface or in its atmosphere . . . .” Draft PPWT, June 12, 2014, supra note 85, art.
I.b.
316
MACDONALD, supra note 307, at 27 (“Notably, China itself has conceded
the difficulty of verifying such an agreement. . . .”); Micah Zenko, supra note 407,
at 3 (noting that “the United States and most other spacefaring nations correctly
oppose the draft treaty on the grounds that it would be unverifiable and would
not cover ground-based systems”).
317 MACDONALD, supra note 307, at 30 (noting that “[s]weeping proposals are
probably unverifiable; certainly most deployment bans on such weapons would
be. Historically, overbroad proposals have acted more as a delaying tactic than
serious policy”).
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The best target for an initial multilateral agreement effort
aimed at increasing safety and security in space is not difficult to
find. The widely acknowledged, dangerous and growing problem
of debris in space is well documented, as is the very real threat that
it poses to all future uses of space. ASAT tests rank among the
greatest concerns in the creation of such debris, as evidenced by
the hugely damaging effects of the 2007 Chinese test (which inspired the drafting of the Code). The destruction of one large satellite alone can create as much debris as would otherwise be generated by seventy to eighty years of ordinary space activity under
strict debris mitigation measures.318 It is thus suggested that an
urgent and important first step in preventing the further production of space debris is an international agreement banning the testing of destructive (debris-generating) ASATs.319
No international agreement currently bans the testing, deployment or use of ASATs. With the exception of a ban on the
placement of weapons of mass destruction in space under the Outer Space Treaty, no space weapons are currently prohibited by any
international agreement at all.320 As noted, even the IADC Guidelines (and the COPUOS Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines that
they inspired), fail to address the problem of ASAT testing. Such
gaps support the larger criticism by many states and legal experts
that the existing legal framework governing space is not adequate
to ensure the security of space objects or prevent an arms race in
space.321 Yet addressing all these deficiencies at once is not a necessary first step.
Instead of attempting to prohibit broad categories of technology and their use (or designating all ASATs as a prohibited class of
weapons), there should be a focus on specific conduct involving
the most damaging ASAT weapons technology—interceptor vehicles or “hit-to-kill” systems employing kinetic energy (“KE”)—
which represent the greatest current threat of weapons-related debris generation in space.322 Fortuitously, the testing of these weapWright, supra note 24, at 24.
Jeffrey Lewis, ‘Hit-to-kill’ and the Threat to Space Assets, in CELEBRATING THE
SPACE AGE, supra note 205, at 22–26.
320 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. IV.
321 See, e.g., Tronchetti, supra note 29, at 367 (“[T]he majority of states and legal experts deem [the existing international legal framework] not adequate to prevent an arms race in space and to guarantee the security of space objects”).
322 Lewis, supra note 319, at 22–23; MACDONALD, supra note 307, at 30 (noting
that “[o]ne possible restriction that merits consideration is a ban on KE-ASAT
318
319
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ons also presents a particular type of conduct that is within the
competence of states to clearly define, regulate and verify under an
appropriate international legal regime.323
Prohibiting tests of KE, hit-to-kill, debris-generating ASATs (or
“destructive” ASAT tests) restricts the use of a weapon that appears to be in the early stages of spreading around the world, addresses real and effective technologies (while resisting futile attempts to define and regulate future exotic technologies), and
maintains a narrow focus on banning the most threatening current
technology—thus avoiding the difficulties inherent in achieving
comprehensive arms control agreements.324 Because the orbital
lifetime of fragments is shorter in low-earth orbits than in higher
orbits (where there may be little or no natural orbital decay due to
atmospheric drag), it is has been suggested that an explicit ban on
ASAT testing in higher geosynchronous orbits would be especially
compelling.325
The growing threat of orbital space debris now threatens to
make space unusable for all spacefaring countries, even for the
great space powers. Once before, when nuclear tests in space by
the superpowers in the Cold War brought competing nations to the
brink of ruining orbital space and causing great damage on earth,
both sides accepted mutual restraint to avert disaster and concluded a legally binding, multilateral agreement banning nuclear tests
in space.326 For all spacefaring countries, and especially for the matests” and that satellites destroyed by KE-ASATs “could render important orbital
areas inhospitable for military or civilian use for decades, even centuries”).
323 Id. at 23 (noting that an advantage of a ban on kinetic-energy ASAT testing is “that it would be both easy to define and to verify, and would allow for a
dialogue to begin without sidestepping any issues”); Wright, supra note 24, at 26
(“One suggestion was that an advantage of a partial arms control measure, such
as a ban on kinetic-energy ASAT testing, is that it would be both easy to define
and to verify, and would allow for a dialogue to begin without sidestepping any
issues”).
324 Lewis, supra note 319, at 23.
325 MACDONALD, supra note 307, at 30. As previously noted, however, debris
in low earth orbit may persist for many decades, presenting a persistent threat to
all spacecraft passing through it.
326
MOLTZ, supra note 95, at 28–29 (2014) (noting that a 1.4 megaton nuclear
test in 1962 400km above earth created such large EMP emissions that it disabled
seven satellites in low earth orbit.); Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the
Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
Similarly, in spite of the tension and mutual mistrust that characterized the Cold
War, the United States and the Soviet Union were able to develop specific, legallybinding rules and procedures governing the activities and interactions of their
military forces in areas other than space (notably on the high seas) to better ensure
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jor space powers, the time for similar, focused, legally-binding restraint with respect to the issue of ASAT testing appears to have
arrived.
5.4. Develop Solutions in the Context of Insecurity, the Geopolitics of
Space, and U.S. Skepticism
China, Russia, and the United States have all successfully
demonstrated ASAT capabilities in tests of various ASAT systems,
including some which apparently involved directed energy weapons (particularly lasers) designed to incapacitate or “dazzle” satellites in non-destructive tests.327 However, the Russian government
has not conducted a destructive ASAT test since 1983 and the last
debris-generating American ASAT test took place in 1985.328 While
the Chinese government has continued to develop new ASAT capabilities, it was clearly surprised by the widespread international
outrage over its 2007 ASAT test and has not conducted any similar
debris-generating tests since that time.329 Although these three
ASAT-active countries appear to have little interest in conducting
further destructive ASAT tests, they nonetheless have much to lose
if other states pursue such testing.
New destructive ASAT tests would not only threaten space
with vast new clouds of debris, but would also bring new fears, instability, and risks of weaponization.330 A new wave of destructive
the safety of navigation and reduce the possibility of conflict by accident, miscalculation, or the failure of communication. See Prevention of Incidents on and over
the High Sea, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 25, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 1168.
327
Laura Grego, A History of Anti-Satellite Programs, UNION OF CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS 5–6, (Jan. 2009) http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/
assets/documents/nwgs/a-history-of-ASAT-programs_lo-res.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/SS2D-6BTF].
328 Id.; see Koplow, supra note 284, at 1209 (noting that the 300 pieces of trackable debris generated by the last U.S destructive ASAT test on September 13, 1985,
took nineteen years to degrade out of orbit).
329
Phillip C. Saunders, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission Hearing on “China’s Space and Counterspace Programs” 10 (Feb.
18,
2015),
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Saunders_Testimony2.
18.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XQN-55ZG] (noting that Chinese officials appear to
have learned from the mistakes they made in both the conduct of the 2007 ASAT
test and how the information was presented publicly and observing that “subsequent 2010 and 2013 tests . . . were conducted against sub-orbital targets and did
not create any long-lived space debris”).
330 Lewis, supra note 319, at 23 (noting that the introduction of ASAT weap-
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ASAT weapon tests is not unimaginable, since countries other than
China, Russia, and the United States, including India, Israel, and
Japan; remain interested in developing hit-to-kill ASAT technology.331 As rivalries in space expand far beyond the confines of the
Cold War, it is important to note that even a limited conflict in
space could be devastating, since the debris generated by such a
conflict could result in the possible loss of near-earth orbit.332
Beyond the potential strategic benefits for the United States of a
legally binding multilateral ban on destructive ASAT tests, no
country has a greater stake than the United States in minimizing
the amount of orbital debris (since it makes the most use of
space).333 The most serious policy concern related to such a ban, at
least in the view of some skeptical members of the U.S. Congress,
remains the possible negative impact on U.S. BMD programs.334
For this reason, the United States may prefer to pursue a partial but
nonetheless effective ban on the most destructive ASAT testing,
one which is limited to at least prohibiting tests above a specified
altitude (thus greatly reducing or eliminating the production of
any long-lived debris while still permitting effective ballistic missile interception tests at lower altitudes).335
ons raise issues of “international stability” in addition to making it “much harder
to reach cooperative agreements on issues such as debris mitigation or space traffic management”).
331 Id.; Ross Liemer & Christopher F. Chyba, A Verifiable Limited Test Ban for
Anti-satellite Weapons, 33 WASH. Q. 149, 154 (July 2010) (noting how India reportedly plans to “develop the capacity to destroy satellites in low-earth and polar orbits” and that Japanese legislation now permits the use of “outer space for military purposes of a defensive nature”); Lewis, supra note 319, at 147–49 (discussing
kinetic energy ASAT development work in Israel, Japan, and European countries).
332 MOLTZ, supra note 95, at 4 (2014).
333 Liemer & Chyba, supra note 331, at 154.
334 See, e.g., 160 CONG. REC. S6936 (daily ed. Jan. 2, 2015) (letter from Sen. David Vitter and Congressman Doug Lamborn to Mr. Frank Rose, Deputy Assistant
Sec’y of State for Space and Def. Pol’y (Nov. 12, 2014)) (stating that “we seek [to]
understand the Administration's position on space arms control, specifically, any
‘debris generating kinetic energy ASAT testing moratorium’” and that “we fear a
new threat to our ability to protect U.S. outer space capabilities, and, perhaps even
to develop our missile defenses”).
335
Liemer & Chyba, supra note 331, at 156 (noting that “[a] test ban above
250—300 km has evidently been the de facto, voluntary practice of the United
States in recent years” and that the “U.S. Missile Defense Agency reports that its
ballistic missile intercept tests were conducted at an altitude of 230 km.” The authors further note that “evidently a ban on testing above 250 or 300 km would not
unduly interfere with missile defense tests . . . . The United States would remain
free (as would other nations) to intercept de-orbiting satellites or to conduct ballistic missile intercept tests below the specified altitude”).
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To be effective, a ban on ASAT testing should be incorporated
in a legally binding international convention that includes the major spacefaring states. Through this mechanism, states can convey
credible commitments to not conduct ASAT tests, provide assurances of their compliance, and establish a framework with clear obligations on which arms control compliance; monitoring and verification measures can be built. It would also provide a solid
foundation for making a prohibition on destructive ASAT tests a
rule of customary international law.336 Participation by the legislatures of participating states in approving or authorizing the
agreement would further advance these goals and also strengthen
the credibility of underlying state commitments.
With respect to U.S. involvement in a ban on destructive ASAT
tests, a legally binding agreement (benefitting from the authorization or approval of the U.S. Congress in the form of a treaty, congressional-executive agreement, or statutory authorization) that
clearly prohibits such ASAT tests would more effectively contribute to the emergence of binding legal norm under customary international law and also enhance rather than diminish the leadership
role that the United States has long played in the development of
international space law.337
A final, practical, strategic reality remains for the United States
and other countries as they contemplate the conclusion of appropriate legally binding multilateral conventions restricting ASAT
tests or other explicitly defined harmful conduct in space. U.S. military planners (as well as the military authorities of the other space
336 Currently, no rule of customary international law prohibits ASAT testing,
even though an examination of state practice indicates that barely half a dozen
ASAT testing events have occurred within the past two decades, conducted by
only three states. Unfortunately, the subjective element or opinio juris necessary to
establish a rule of customary international law (that states are conforming to what
they view is a legal obligation) is clearly lacking. See Koplow, supra note 284, at
1237–38 (noting that “the three ASAT-active States have certainly never indicated
that any existing legal compulsion circumscribes their actions” and noting the
conspicuous failure on the part of states to label the 2007 Chinese ASAT test as
“‘illegal’ or ‘inconsistent with’ any particular legal obligations”).
337
As noted, clearly formulated rules of a “norm-creating character” which
are first framed in legally binding agreements may later become binding rules of
customary international law if they subsequently enjoy the “widespread and representative participation” of states and this state practice is carried out in such a
way “as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the
existence of a rule of law requiring it.” See N. Sea Cont'l Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 42–44
(Feb. 20, 1969).
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powers) must remain prepared to protect their assets in space in
the event of a conflict in the strategically vital domain of space.
In spite of the goals of peaceful cooperation in space, U.S. military doctrine clearly requires the U.S. forces to be capable in time
of conflict to take measures “to prevent an adversary's hostile use
of US/third-party space capabilities,” to successfully engage in “offensive operations to negate an adversary's space capabilities used
to interfere with or attack US/allied space systems,” and to negate
“adversary space capabilities through deception, disruption, denial, degradation, or destruction actions.”338 Achieving these mission
objectives seems highly unlikely if U.S. forces do not have the necessary weapons to achieve and maintain superior military capabilities.339
Some commentators have thus suggested that while the United
States continues to pursue appropriate multilateral security agreements (such as one banning debris-generating ASAT tests) and
continues to refrain from taking clearly provocative actions in
space (particularly the flight testing and deployment of clearlydedicated space weaponry), it should maintain a “hedging strategy
against space warfare capabilities or unpleasant surprises.”340 Such
a hedging strategy requires, among other things, laboratory research and development of basic ASAT technologies with a central
goal of “providing assurance that the United States is not surprised, and technologically outdistanced, by advances in ASAT ca-

338
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ET AL., JOINT STAFF PUBLICATION 3 – 14: SPACE
OPERATIONS (29 May 2013), II-8, available at http://www.dtic.mil/ doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_14.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EY2-RHGD].
339 Report of the Commission to Assess United States Security Space Management
and Organization, U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, Executive Summary, x (Jan. 11, 2001),
available at http://www.dod.gov/pubs/space20010111.html [https://perma.cc/
3724-A8W3]

[W]e know from history that every medium—air, land and sea—has seen
conflict. Reality indicates that space will be no different. Given this virtual certainty, the U.S. must develop the means both to deter and to defend against hostile acts in and from space. This will require superior
space capabilities.
340
MICHAEL KREPON & CHRISTOPHER CLARY, SPACE ASSURANCE OR SPACE
DOMINANCE?: THE CASE AGAINST WEAPONIZING SPACE 78 (2003) (further arguing
that deployment of war-fighting capabilities by the United States “is likely to generate the launch of relatively cheap, low-tech, but lethal ASATs by weaker adversaries” and that “the flight-testing and deployment of dedicated space weaponry
would add new instability in crisis and new impulses toward escalation. It would
be folly to invite these consequences unless it is absolutely necessary to do so”).
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pabilities that another country is able to achieve.”341
With these goals in mind, any arms control agreement or soft
law instrument that the United States contemplates joining which
will regulate space activities must be sufficiently precise to ensure
that no implicit or de facto restrictions are imposed on essential defense capabilities or the ability to engage in strategic “hedging”
(particularly military space R&D programs).342 As discussed
above, however, the broad and imprecise terms of the Code may
raise concerns that the scrutiny of military programs by civil society in liberal democracies could result in de facto restrictions on important military R&D space weapon programs and related activities.
6. CONCLUSION
Efforts to prevent the proliferation of space debris cannot be
fully realized without also dealing with the threat to the sustainable use of space posed by destructive ASAT tests. The Code’s proposed application of its own variant of soft law to these very different but related problem areas unfortunately portends failure.
Modest but important progress in both these areas is, however,
feasible through limited hard law approaches which focus on destructive ASAT testing in the context of the reality of acute security
concerns.
Such tailored hard law approaches offer a genuine “next step”
in solving the most serious problems confronting the international
community in space. They also complement, rather than interfere
with, successful bottom-up soft law approaches that allowed the
space agencies of leading spacefaring states to generate technical
guidelines reducing the routine generation of orbital space debris.
These hard law approaches stand in stark contrast to the flawed
341 Id. at 80 (noting that another central goal is “to provide assurance to potential adversaries that, should they initiate the flight-testing and deployment of
space warfare capabilities, they will prompt a most unwelcome reaction by the
United States”).
342 Such policies are generally consistent with the position of the current and
previous U.S. administrations. As previously noted, Secretary of State Clinton reaffirmed in 2012 the central U.S. commitment to preserving its national defense
capabilities in space by noting that the United States will not enter into any code
of conduct “that in any way constrains our national security-related activities in
space or our ability to protect the United States and our allies.” See Press Statement, Sec’y of State Clinton, supra note 18.
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variant of soft law embodied in the Code, one which risks confusion and increased insecurity even as it distracts states from pursuing more effective models.
While the U.S. government has indicated some interest in pursuing a ban on destructive ASAT tests, no proposal to ban ASAT
tests is under consideration at this time. In spite of the merits of
such an initiative, U.S. government officials indicated in late 2014
that no decision has been made to propose such an agreement.343
When asked to further explain this position during recent Congressional hearings, administration officials repeated that they had no
plans to pursue a ban on debris-generating ASAT testing, noting
instead that “[c]urrently, our diplomatic focus is on the development of an International Code of Conduct on Outer Space Activities.”344
The Code thus continues to consume the time and effort of the
government of the United States and the governments of other
states in the international community, diverting resources that
could otherwise be dedicated to more meaningful steps to improve
safety and security of space. In this sense, the proposed Code is
not just a looming failure on the horizon but, to use another helpful
space metaphor, it is also a black hole exerting a strong gravitational pull that few governments seem able to resist.

343
160 CONG. REC. S6936 (daily ed. Jan. 2, 2015) (Letter from Julia Frifield,
Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, to Sen. Vitter (November 17,
2014)) (“At this time, the Administration has made no decision to propose the negotiation of a debris-generating ASAT testing moratorium . . . we have not made a
specific proposal to allies for negotiation of a debris-generating ASAT testing
moratorium”).
344
Id. (Letter from Julia Frifield, Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative
Affairs, to Sen. Vitter, (Dec. 10, 2014) (“The administration has no plans to propose the negotiation of a debris-generating ASAT testing moratorium at this
time . . . . Currently, our diplomatic focus is on the development of an International Code of Conduct on Outer Space Activities”).
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